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ZARABETH: Yes. He gave me weapons, a shelter, food. Everything I needed to live except 
companionship. He did not want it said that he had me killed. But to send me here alone, if that is not 
death, what is? A very inventive mind, that man.  Star Trek - “All Our Yesterdays”.1
Abstract
Derek Parfit maintains in Reasons and Persons  that personal identity consists in two things. 2
Person A and person B are the same person only if: 
1. A and B are psychologically very similar [R&P 216], that is, in their psychological states, 
including memory and desire, and also personality traits and tastes.
And:
2. A and B are connected by the “right kind of cause" [R&P 216]; that is, they have the same body 
over time.
Parfit also maintains, however, that personal identity does not matter, in the sense that what I care 
about when I have special concern for my future states does not depend on identity. Person B, 
really matters to Person A, in Parfit's view, only if:
1. A and B are psychologically very similar.
And:
2. A and B are connected by "any cause" [R&P 217]; that is, I may still care about a person who 
does not have the same body as me so long as we are very similar and connected in some other 
fashion.  For example, a teleportation machine that destroys my body while reproducing the 
relevant psychological traits in another body is a cause that connects me to the other person in 
such a way that I will have special concern for that person.
 Shatner, William, Leonard Nimoy, DeForest Kelley, and Mariette Hartley. 1968. Star trek, the television 1
series. All Our Yesterdays. Hollywood, CA: Paramount Pictures Corp. Accessed 13/11/20. http://
www.chakoteya.net/StarTrek/78.htm
 Parfit, Derek. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 1986.  [Hereafter 2
referred to as “R&P” and page number].  
I invite the reader to use the following online resource to check my references to Parfit: http://
www.stafforini.com/docs/Parfit%20-%20Reasons%20and%20persons.pdf  Some of the page numbers are 
not the same as the original book but it allows easy searching for any particular piece of text.
 3
I argue here that Parfit's second causal criterion is neither necessary nor sufficient for justifying 
special concern. I accept the first criterion as a necessary condition and introduce and defend a 
different second criterion that emphasises social connectedness. I maintain that A has justified 
special concern for B only if 1 obtains and: 
2. Relevant social connections recognise A and B as the same person, and that person is in some 
way at least potentially accessible to them.
In defending this view, I present various accounts of personal identity and of what matters (Part 1 
and 2), and I argue that Parfit's causal criterion for special concern fails (Chapter 3). Then, I 
present my account of social connectedness (Chapter 6) and defend its importance for justified 
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It is a curious fact that much of the important work done on personal identity has not been in 
volumes dedicated to the subject, but rather in works of philosophical genius that cover a broad 
range of subjects.  From Locke, with An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,  to Parfit with 3
Reasons and Persons.  These works are central to understanding the general philosophical view of 
personal identity today, yet none focuses purely on it.  This generalism suggests that advances in 
understanding, so far as personal identity is concerned, are accompanied by a broader 
philosophical understanding.
   This work does focus on personal identity and the issues around it, but it also comes from a 
broader philosophical background.  It was originally about the philosophical issues that arose from 
the movie Groundhog Day , which has become a classic by being the first significant and popular 4
treatment of the metaphysical and ethical issues arising from being in a time loop. In the movie, 
Phil is a TV weatherman sent to a small town to cover the Groundhog festival along with his 
production crew.  When he realises that he is trapped in a time loop, his behaviour becomes 
increasingly bizarre and antisocial.  Despite the obvious change in his behaviour, his production 
crew treat him as being the same person.  The movie’s writers having characters ignore his 
change in personality is of interest because most of the major current theories of personal identity 
take psychological continuity to be the thing that connects our identity from one time to another.  In 
this example, Phil does have internal psychological continuity but, (due to his behavioural change) 
from the perspective of the other protagonists in Groundhog Day he does not.5
   Characters in Groundhog Day do not generally regard psychological continuity as important for 
personal identity at an intuitive level but are instead animalist.  So long as his colleagues see Phil 
as being the same animal that they knew before, then he is also seen as being the same person.
   Suppose the fiction of Groundhog Day is accurate in predicting general human responses when 
interacting with someone who does not seem to be psychologically continuous with their previous 
self.  In that case, it suggests that we too are unconsciously animalists - when it comes to personal 
Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. La Vergne: Neeland Media LLC, 2019. Internet 
resource. 
 Ramis, Harold, Trevor Albert, C.O Erickson, Danny Rubin, Bill Murray, Andie MacDowell, Chris Elliott, 4
Stephen Tobolowsky, Brian Doyle-Murray, George Fenton, Pe.mbroke J. Herring, and John Bailey. 
Groundhog Day. Culver City, Calif: Columbia TriStar Home Video, 2002
 I discovered that some of the most interesting issues in Groundhog Day were the ones of personal identity.5
Locke thought that personal identity was generated by memory.
   Groundhog Day style thought experiments seem to come from a somewhat Lockean view of personal 
identity since the only difference between the aware and unaware participants is memory.
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identity.  Philosophers generally disparage animalism as a description of personal identity.   For 6
instance, they generally take the brain to be a privileged organ when it comes to transplantation 
and would not advise its replacement.  Animalism takes object identity (in terms of the animal) to 
be personal identity, whereas other views typically give the psychology of a person greater 
prominence.  Perhaps psychological states are given greater prominence by people at an 
intellectual level because people are biased towards the intellect at an intellectual level.
   Everyday people seem to be intuitively animalist, (as in seeing the identity of a person as being 
the presence of the same animal), whereby they take the markers of the animal identity of other 
people to be indicated by such things as physical appearance.  Philosophers do not generally 
regard such things as appearance as being important in the intellectual understanding of personal 
identity.  The difference between the popular and the philosophical understandings of identity 
suggests a contrast between immediate intuitions about personal identity and deeply examined 
ones.  For instance, Phil in Groundhog Day is always treated by his production crew as he was 
before he entered the loop, regardless of the behavioural discontinuity which has obviously 
happened in him, due to his psychological changes from being in the loop.
   Rather than being psychological continuity, intuitive animalism cashes out as Nozick’s  “closest 7
continuer” theory at an intellectual level, but there is more to be said about identity than just this.  
Our intuitions, generated from the fictional scenario seen in Groundhog Day, conflict with our 
supposed intuitions about identity in a number of different ways:
   Firstly, in Groundhog Day, there is the incongruous fact about future survival, that a non-memory 
updating participant seems to be predicted to have less concern about being in a time loop, than 
the ‘looping’ person, who actually experiences ongoing psychological survival in normal terms.   
What this means is, that in fictional representations of time loop scenarios, characters who are not 
having their memories updated for each loop (like the central character is) might be predicted to be 
distraught, as it means a break in their psychological continuity and thus equivalent to our ordinary 
conception of death, whereas in fact they are depicted as being more at ease with the situation 
than the central character.  This unconcern is the case even when they believe that the central 
character is in a time loop.  This (again, if we are to generalise it to us) suggests that we have an 
intuitively ‘majority rules’ understanding of future survival.  If there is the situation where the world 
is going to blink out of existence, to be replaced with a world as this one was a day ago, except for 
one person who will be inserted into that later world, then that is seen as a problem for that ‘sole 
survivor’ and not for the general population.  This supposition supports a theory I later develop 
about social connectedness being important.
 Blatti, Stephan, "Animalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. 6
Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/animalism/ 
 Nozick. Robert, Philosophical explanations, Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1981. p. 29.7
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   Secondly, Groundhog Day challenges our intuitions about causal history and how that should 
affect us, for instance by the presence, (or lack of) a build up of duties, responsibilities and debts 
from previous loops.  I deal with examples of this at the end of the thesis. 
 I also came to the idea that background metaphysics (outside of our direct experience) should not 
be a determiner of how we should act instead of our apparent experiential relationships.  I express 
this as the idea that “the information in the universe is the universe”. A good example is Russell’s 
five-minute world and my analysis of it.
   As a sceptical hypothesis, Bertrand Russell imagines a situation where the world has only been 
in existence for five minutes. I interpret it as a metaphysical and ethical thought experiment, related 
somewhat to the Groundhog Day situation by also being a world in which history does not have its 
usual meaning, and it provokes us to examine what we should think about that. It became clear to 
me that Russell’s five-minute world showed us that what we cared about in current and future 
states, was the current informational state and not prior causal states, and so it was of little 
importance whether these prior causal states ever existed.
   I decided that a deep similarity (mostly of the psychological kind) was the sole determiner of 
identity, but at that stage I meant the narrow mental content within the person themselves, and any 
mental content identical to that, outside the person (the extended self). In order to help prove this 
view as the correct one, I became interested in the case of Swampman, and the literature on 
whether a randomly created being can produce meaning. I was interested in this because a 
randomly created being has no causal history. 
 
“Swampman” is an example introduced by Donald Davidson , whereby a person enters a swamp 8
and is hit, and vaporised by lightning.  Then at the same moment, a different bolt of lightning hits 
nearby, and by some improbable occurrence, this second bolt creates an apparent person, 
physically and functionally identical to the original.  The question is whether this closest continuer 
duplicate has thoughts and could generate meaningful statements?  To me it was obvious that it 
did and could, and my question was whether it should inherit the same rights and responsibilities 
as the person who entered the swamp. 
   I believed that swampman could be a relevant example in the philosophy of personal identity as 
well.  My idea was that since we would have to extend to a being that had no causal history, 
humanity, personhood, and other valuable traits, that would prove that causal history was not 
important to us.  I was puzzled as to why Davidson had ever introduced the example in an attempt 
to prove the opposite thesis: That Swampman could create no meaning.
   When I questioned visiting professor Sally Haslanger about her intuitions on the Swampman 
case if a Swampman replaced her husband Steven Yablo, I was very surprised that her intuitions 
 Davidson, Donald. Knowing One's Own Mind, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical 8
Association, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Jan., 1987), pp. 441-458, American Philosophical Association, http://
www.jstor.org/stable/3131782
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did not match mine, and became further fascinated by the philosophy of personal identity.  I 
thereby changed my thesis to be focusing on personal identity, rather than repetitious situations.
Initially, my thesis focused on trying to prove that a causal link was not important in survival or 
personal identity, but rather similarity of mental content was. I came into contact with Parfit’s ideas 
on personal identity, which have a causal link between two temporal stages and similarity between 
psychological content as some of the requirements, but it was far from clear what he meant by 
cause.9
   Parfit has a two-stage process whereby he defines personal identity as psychological continuity 
and connectedness with the right kind of cause, but what matters in survival as psychological 
continuity and connectedness with any cause.
   I agree with Parfit that what matters with respect to what we should care about is not identity but 
something else.  Parfit takes that thing to be “Relation R” (psychological continuity and/or 
connectedness with any cause) [R&P 215].  I take what matters to be similarity between two 
spacetime points to as wide an extent as possible, including our current interpersonal relations, 
with a causal link not essential to survival.
   Parfit says there is no “further fact” about personal identity, other than psychological continuity 
and/or connectedness with the right cause (and the right cause is any cause).  More importantly, 
he says there is no further fact about whether a future person is worth caring about, other than 
psychological continuity and connectedness with any cause.  My main disagreement with Parfit 
regards this ‘further fact’.  I agree that there is no further fact in the sense of a ‘magical essence’.  
Yet, there is a further fact in what I initially called the ‘extended person’ as the identical traits we 
share with others, and later the ‘network identity’ , as the network of connections which we have 10
with others.  This social network is almost totally overlooked by philosophers studying personal 
identity, even though it is one of the main criteria by which ordinary people define identity.  That is, 
the identity applied by others.  I seek to prove that ordinary people are right in this instance.
   In this way, I hope that I have met Professor Haslanger worry.  A ‘swamp Yablo’ may not be as 
good as a regular Yablo, just because of social concerns about such things as randomly created 
beings.  The social links may not exist between the swamp Yablo and other people in the same 
way due to them being viewed differently.  This ‘extrinsic’ view is quite an outlier in the literature on 
personal identity but would be similar to the view that a deleted file is not as good as a regular file 
 One of my main issues with Parfit at this point, is that many of his examples cause confusion and it is 9
unclear exactly what he means.  Late in writing the thesis I discovered in an appendix [R&P 477] a reply that 
Parfit had to Nozick regarding the theory that identity is via closest continuer rather than psychological 
continuity as Parfit says.  I had always taken psychological continuity to effectively be the closest continuer in 
the psychological realm.  Yet Parfit takes it to be something more like content similarity, which is what I had 
been trying to prove all along.
 Network might be considered to be social identity plus the identity to any entities that we might not 10
consider to be part of social groups. e.g. computers.
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on a computer.  The fact is that when a computer ‘deletes’ a file, it does not actually erase it but 
rather tells the operating system to no longer regard it as existing within an index of files.  So the 
content of a deleted file is the same as a regular file, yet it is how the network regards it that is of 
critical importance.
Later in writing the thesis, I came to two new understandings.  Firstly, I believe there is no ‘final 
fact’ which determines identity in all conceptual cases.  Parfit believes something like this when he 
says that:
 
It is not true that our identity is always determinate.  I can always ask, ‘Am I about to die?’ But it is 
not always true that, in every case, this question must have an answer, which must be either Yes or 
No.  In some cases this would be an empty question. [R&P 216/217] 
Since, under extraordinary circumstances, we may not be able to determine identity, and it is 
impossible to determine the exact boundaries of these circumstances, we can only say there are 
conventional facts about personal identity, but not final logical facts about personal identity.  Thus, 
for instance, with regards to death, it is always contingent on future events whether death ‘holds’ 
as being the case.
   The second realisation is to do with the psychological view of personal identity, which I call 
‘getting it’ (at an intuitive psychological level as opposed to an intellectual level).
On ‘getting it’
Parfit gives some examples that are supposed to cause the reader to reject intuitive personal 
identity. However, some of Parfit’s examples are uncompelling. For example, when I originally read 
about the thought experiment of someone having each hemisphere of their brain transplanted into 
a different body, I was not convinced (in the way that I was supposed to be convinced) that there 
was a genuine problem to be solved.  I could see a genuine problem to be solved in his 
teleportation case, but with split brains, Parfit did not convince me that people could really fission, 
by having their brain hemispheres separated, with two new people created.  I presumed that it 
would result in two massively damaged persons.
  It was not until I thought about death, and about the iceman found in an Italian glacier that I 
emotionally ‘got it’, in terms of understanding at a psychological level, what Parfit is saying about 
identity being indeterminate in certain circumstances.  I asked: When does someone go from being 
a living being to being unretrievable in terms of that person’s existence?  My answer is that there is 
no specific point that this occurs.  A person’s existence does not depend on them having a certain 
level of psychological continuity, or even similarity. I have concern for my future self that graduates 
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from lesser to greater concern, depending on the level of similarity with my current self and current 
circumstances.
   Let us imagine that we regard heart transplants as we typically regard brain transplants, and that 
we consider that a person ‘dies’ during the period in which the hearts get swapped over (as in ‘I 
was clinically dead for five minutes during the surgery’).  However, unlike our typical 
characterisation of that kind of clinical death, we apply the concepts of legal and social death to 
that understanding.  That would mean that where someone says that they ‘died for five minutes’ (or 
similar), we would then start reading their legal will and treating them as a new person, much as 
people often suggest we do in the Swampman case.
   Identity really ‘gets real’ when it comes to the issue of when we should apply the concepts of 
legal and social death.  We are legally dead when others have the legal ability to act as if we are 
dead.  We are socially dead when there is that kind of treatment socially.  For example, people 
might think that Jeremy Bentham sought to avoid social death in some sense by having his stuffed 
body preserved and brought out for meetings at University College London.  Yet, the question of 
when someone dies is secondary to the core issue.  If I die and, then sometime afterwards, 
someone heaps up a lot of atoms and puts together a replica of me, then the intuitive conception of 
that is, it is all very well, but it does not help me.  Yet intuitively, if my corpse gets resurrected, then 
it does help me.  No one can tell where the line is between these things, such as if one has some 
of Jeremy Bentham’s hair and builds the rest of his body around that.  That is what makes personal 
identity as a concept fall apart, and that is what must be understood psychologically.
   ‘Getting it’ when it comes to personal identity is an all or nothing thing.  It is almost a religious 
experience, and Parfit alludes to that, but because I am doing analytic philosophy, I will not 
emphasise this emotional part when analysing the issues.
Parfit says:
 
I claim that a person is not like a Cartesian Ego, a being whose existence must be all-or-nothing. 
[R&P 275] 
And:
When I believed that my existence was such a [deep] further fact I seemed imprisoned in myself.  
My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of 
which there was darkness.  When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared.  I 
now live in the open air.  There is still a difference between my life and the lives of other people.  But 
the difference is less.  Other people are closer.  I am less concerned about the rest of my own life, 
and more concerned about the lives of others.” [R&P 281] 
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If that doesn’t seem particularly philosophical language, then the very last paragraph of Reasons 
and Persons says: 
 
The mental and material are really here, but here there is no human being to be found.  For it is void 
and merely fashioned like a doll.  Just suffering piled up like grass and sticks. [R&P 503] 
Parfit gets this understanding of personal identity.  What Parfit has not ‘got’, however, is full nihilism 
about personal identity.  He still believes there is at least a graduated fact about personal identity, 
just that these facts are reducible to psychological continuity and the like.  Parfit’s philosophical 
conception of psychological continuity is a proxy for content similarity of a psychological kind.  
Parfit turns out to be gradualist about personal identity, which means that there can be no final 
answer about whether something has a particular identity - just its degree of similarity.  Lack of 
facts is one of the things he does not go all-in on.  The other is stating that content similarity is of 
importance in a blatant way.  My view is that there can be a further fact - and that is network 
identity; there just cannot be a final fact.  Like Parfit, I see the closest continuer view as the intuitive 
view of identity; however, it is not an absolute determiner of objective identity - since nothing could 
be, except where something is identical over time.  Human beings are certainly not that.
   Philosopher Robert Nozick originally put forth the closest continuer view of personal identity , 11
whereby our identity over time is the being that is the closest continuer to us now.  One basic 
problem with the closest continuer view is working out where the cut off is for when something is 
the close enough continuer, for there to be a supposed ‘fact’ about whether there is personal 
identity or not.
This means that there can never be a final fact about personal identity under all circumstances.
Conceptual considerations
It is worth pointing out that what follows is an intuitive, conceptual understanding of identity and 
what matters in survival.  This means an understanding that makes sense in philosophical terms.  I 
do not draw on the scientific facts of the matter very heavily, as this is a philosophic, not a scientific 
thesis.  A scientific thesis might come to a completely different idea about identity, particularly 
regarding causality, as causality is seen as an important notion in science.  Regardless of that, the 
main body of the thesis is on what matters in survival, and science should have a good deal less to 
say about that.
   In terms of this topic, I feel I have made some very substantial progress.  The reason for this is 
not so much the quality of my scholarship or level of intelligence.  It is despite this.  There is less 
research on this very important topic than might be expected, and much of what exists is fractured 
 Nozick. Robert, Philosophical explanations, Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1981.11
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and in silos.  In particular, I think of the Swampman example being generally not examined by the 
philosophical community in terms of identity - but only meaning. 
   The major work in personal identity is by Parfit in Reasons and Persons, and the portion on 
identity is only part of a larger work with a broader agenda.  Frankly, it is a work of genius, but 
there are some major deficiencies with it, which I will, of course, discuss.   
More importantly, there has been no significant advance in the field since Parfit.  Scott Campbell 
has made the most important advances, yet he is almost unknown.   
   The main way this thesis advances philosophical understanding, is to bring together disparate 
examples to more thoroughly refute causal connection as a determiner of identity and assign 
content similarity as the best determiner of what matters.  Also important, is giving an extrinsic 
(external) role to networks in determining identity relations, and these have an element of 
subjectivity to them.12
Thesis summary
In science fiction and thought experiments, there may be multiple successor selves to our current 
self.  Parfit, a major thinker on personal identity has said that our identity:
Over time just involves (a) Relation R - psychological connectedness and or psychological continuity 
with the right kind of cause, provided (b) that this relation does not take a branching form… [R&P 
216] 
But 
Personal identity is not what matters.  What fundamentally matters is Relation R with any cause. 
[R&P 217] 
This thesis attempts to answer the basic question: What matters (in rational terms) regarding our 
future states?  Is it maintaining the same identity, as per our intuitive understanding of identity, or is 
it something else?  In order to answer this, we must see what creates identity relations, both 
intuitively and logically.  Once we have done this, we can see if what matters is identity relations or 
something else.  
   I propose that what matters is ‘content similarity’; That what matters about our future states is not 
whether they have a strict intuitive identity relation with us now, but rather whether there is a being 
 That is, there is some element of thinking making it so.12
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that has maximum content similarity with us now, and this content similarity is as ‘wide’ as possible, 
so that it retains as many of the currently external connections as possible.
   How are identity relations formed?  What is the thing that means someone is the same person at 
another time or another place?  Is it that there is a similarity between the people, or is it that there 
is a causal link between the people at one time and another?
There turns out to be no ‘final fact’ that can conclusively link persons at two separate times, as 
being the same person under all conceivable scenarios, but we typically use a heuristic; where 
identity relations are formed intuitively as:
 
1) That physical identity is a particular kind of spatiotemporal continuity formed by similarity at 
timeframes as short as we can possibly access, regardless of cause. And:
2) At the different times under consideration, there is a high degree of content similarity in the entity 
between one time and another.  So we consider a person is the same being if they follow the same 
path through time and space.  We will define the same person through time and space as the 
closest continuer person in content similarity to the already identified object/person in space/time. 
And: 
The closest continuer continues to be somewhat similar to the initially identified entity so that it is 
not just the closest continuer by default, but rather by being increasingly similar at shorter 
intermediate timeframes.
Content similarity in relation to the identity of people/objects breaks down into two types:
One (the narrow) I define as the information inherent to the object/person, for instance (but not 
exhaustively) internal structure, as well as position and shape.
Two (the wide) network identity, would be defined as the extrinsic network of connections linking to 
the object from information held about it in other objects/people.  However: 
What we care about with regards to future states (‘what matters’) does not follow our intuitions 
about physical identity but is instead about content similarity being as close as possible to present 
content similarity (point to point).  This similarity is important because it is as close as possible to 
what we care about now.  This means that “our identity is not what matters”, as Parfit put it, [245 
R&P], but rather it is the future state of a person being as close to the present state of the person, 
to as wide an extent as possible.  That being, that they retain as many of the links between them 
and other entities as possible and have their own internal similarity.  
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   I have developed many arguments to support this view, from analysing (Davidson’s) ‘Swampman’ 
scenarios to understanding how we would react in time-loop situations.  I shall explain in detail how 
these scenarios are plausible, and what we can learn from them.  All of this is regardless of cause.  
   People commonly believe causality to be key to identity and what matters.  One basic argument I 
have against causality being important is that if a swamp-person appears, we would have no 
reason for treating it any differently to the original person due to its lack of causality alone. Also, in 
a time-loop scenario, it should not matter about the metaphysical background of why someone 
appears in the loop, but we should deal with them on the same basis as our previous interactions.  
For example: In the movie Groundhog Day, Phil is killed multiple times, and yet viewers still accept 
him as Phil (based on his content similarity) and would do regardless of the cause of his 
reappearance.
A lack of causality in the background metaphysics of events should not influence our view and 
have no implications for how we act.  For instance, if the world came into existence recently, as in 
Russell’s Five Minute World example , then that alone should not influence how we live in any 13
way.  Network identity is key to understanding why this is.
An explanation of terms
In this thesis, I talk about identity in intuitive terms, which means the practical terms we use to 
understand identity from day to day.  This does not mean identity in absolute terms, because 
identity in absolute terms can only be between two instances of narrow content in an object that 
are identical even in space and time and are connected as being the closest identical arrangement.  
Technically, this means that identity in absolute terms is not possible for living beings whilst they 
normally remain alive.  We can also talk about ‘what matters’ regarding survival, not in absolute 
terms but in terms of what is most ‘reasonable’ - Reasonable being; what we have most reasons to 
do, by it being most advantageous within our overall system of belief.
   As for my term “network identity”, it may be considered to be ‘social identity plus’.  That is social 
identity plus any other relevant wide content.  A good example would be that a lot of information is 
stored about us in computer systems.  If all the information about an individual was deleted we 
could say that this would not strictly affect their social identity but rather their broader network 
identity.
 Russell, Bertrand. The Analysis of Mind, The Floating Press, 2008. Ebook, p. 203. https://ebookcentral-13
proquest-com.ezproxy.otago.ac.nz/lib/otago/detail.action?docID=432353
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On psychological continuity and/or connectedness
Throughout this thesis, I refer to Parfit’s Relation R - psychological continuity and/or 
connectedness.  Parfit defines psychological connectedness as “the holding of particular direct 
psychological connections” and psychological continuity as “the holding of overlapping chains of 
strong connectedness”. [R&P, 206] 
Parfit says this in his theory of personal identity before he goes into what matters about survival. 
   Parfit’s concept of psychological connectedness is inadequate and somewhat misdescribes the 
supposed connection involved.  When he says “connectedness”, what that really amounts to is a 
similarity in states of beings, so that, if for instance, I have the same preference or belief as 
yesterday, I am considered to be psychologically connected to how I was yesterday.  Parfit regards 
connectedness as inadequate to describe identity because someone, over their lifetime, is 
regarded as being the same person even though they may change a great deal and by that 
criterion have little ‘connection’ (meaning similarity) with how they were when they were young.  
Much later in Reasons and Persons [R&P, 301-302], Parfit considers whether an entity having 
continuity alone is sufficient for having what matters in survival.  He regards it as not being enough 
- there must be ‘connection’ also.  By connection, he means the same kind of psychological 
content, such as desires and memories.   To show this more clearly, he gives the example of 14
immortal beings who change a lot over time and says:
 
When such a person says for example ‘I spent a period exploring the Himalayas’ his hearers would 
not be entitled to assume that the speaker had any memories of the period, or that his character 
then and now are in any way similar… [My emphasis on similar]. [R&P 304] 
Therefore Parfit’s idea of connectedness and my idea of content similarity are much closer than I 
previously thought.
   With regard to psychological continuity, it can’t just be strong connectedness in the normal sense 
of ‘connection’, because you can have continuity without any connection at all.  The word 
“connection” sounds like a link, but in the way that Parfit uses it is really used to say a shared 
similarity at the relevant times. 
Parfit talks about continuity as “the holding of overlapping chains of strong connectedness” [R&P 
206], but since I can’t make much sense of this concept I prefer to think of continuity as: That 
which continues on in the same fashion as before, regardless of a specific link with what happened 
before. 
 Also see: Bartels, D.M, and L.J Rips. "Psychological Connectedness and Intertemporal Choice." Journal of 14
Experimental Psychology: General. 139.1 (2010): 49-69, p.50-51, http://home.uchicago.edu/bartels/
ChoiceSymposium2013/02a-Bartels.pdf.
 17
Why “content similarity” and “closest continuer”?
With regards to “content”, Parfit says that human beings have content and says that:  
Persons must be mentioned in describing the content [his emphasis] of countless thoughts, desires, 
and other experiences.” [R&P 226] 
Content similarity is the concept of informational similarity within a specific bound.  That being the 
boundary of the entity in question.  I was asked, “Why not use the concept of properties?  as in: 
Two objects are the same object if they have the same properties.”   The main reason is that 15
content focuses on the substance of the object in question, whereas its properties can be almost 
anything related to the object, including extrinsic properties.  Sven Bernecker says:
What does it mean to say of two objects that they are similar? Intuitively, we say that objects are 
similar because they have most or many properties in common. But this intuition doesn’t take us very 
far, because all objects have infinite sets of properties in common.  16
There is an issue of clarity when deciding whether to use ‘properties’ or ‘content’.  If I refill my cup, 
it would be clearer to ask for the refill to consist of similar content to before, than to ask for a 
substance that has similar properties as before.  It seems likely that a substance could have similar 
properties and yet be very different, whereas if it has similar content it will be more fundamentally 
similar.  This is because similar content seems to entail more internally relevant properties than 
speaking of properties themselves.
  An example of irrelevant extrinsic properties is that the only difference between objects might be 
that some people think they are different.  In that case, it would be possible to say that there is a 
difference simply because some people falsely believe them to be different.  The object/objects 
would have different properties but only the external property of being thought to be different.
  The concept of properties breaks down into intrinsic and extrinsic properties.  In my use of 
language, I call what might be called 'intrinsic properties' narrow content and extrinsic properties 
wide content.  The terms ‘narrow’ and ‘wide’ content are usually used in relation to mental 
representational content, but I am using them to describe physical states of the world themselves.  
Narrow content refers to all that which is within the bounds of the person.  The wide content 
includes the narrow, and also anything outside that to a particular scope.  Where a person’s 
 In conversation with Michael LeBuffe.15
 Bernecker, Sven. The Metaphysics of Memory. Dordrecht: Springer, 2008, p.156.16
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relevant wide content involves information about them elsewhere in the world, I call it their network 
identity.  
  As for the name of the type of content similarity needed to link two spatio-temporally disparate 
objects together as being the same object/person over time, I originally used the phrase “Next 
closest” - as in our identity is maintained as the next closest thing to us through time and space.  
However, I found that Nozick was using “next closest” to denote the second closest object/person 
after the closest continuer. i.e.
It may appear incoherent to care especially about the closest continuer qua closest continuer, but 
not care especially that there be a continuer that is closest.  Focusing on the gap between the 
closest continuer and the next closest , it is as if I care a lot about this gap when it exists, but do not 
care, at all whether this is this gap.  17
Because of Nozick’s usage, I thought that it would be too confusing to use “next closest” and would 
instead adopt the use of Nozick’s “closest continuer” labelling.  However, this adoption is not 
without its problems because I am only talking about the closest continuer in terms of similarity, 
whereas Nozick is also talking about causal connection.
Nozick says: 
We care about continuation rather than merely that some qualitatively similar entity will exist… A later 
continuer, unlike a mere qualitative resembler, has its aspects connected, causally or subjunctively 
or however, to the characteristics of the earlier self; it would not be like it is (though that route) if the 
earlier self had not been that way.  Part of the profile of the later self may stand to the characteristics 
of the earlier self in the very same relation a belief stands in to the fact when it constitutes 
knowledge.  It is as if your later self knows you now, and so (except in special cases) views you as 
its closest predecessor.  Connecting with that later self is a way of not sinking into oblivion. 
[Philosophical Explanations p.66] 
This is a very poor argument, but that is what happens when people attempt to justify cause.  Many 
philosophers believe that we need to have causality as part of identity.  When trying to justify why 
we need causality, they say it is because we need causality.  It is so bad, that it is literally the case 
that in the place where he is supposed to explain why causality is required, the famous philosopher 
puts a jumble of assertions and unconnected sentences.    When is a future self you?  Is Nozick 
saying it is when it is true that it is so, and when you are justified in thinking so?  In that case it is 
self-referential.  The defence of causality itself sinks into oblivion. 
 Nozick, Robert. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1981, p.65.17
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On the identity of indiscernibles
Before talking about issues of when we have (or do not have) a certain identity, it is worth 
mentioning that there is an issue with assigning identity to any object or person that changes in any 
way over time, as, if ‘two’ things are identical in all respects, then they are one and the same. We 
can avoid this issue if we only refer to the narrow internal content of an entity remaining the same. 
However, with persons, even that narrow internal content is constantly changing, so what could 
form a stable means of assigning personal identity? This is why I say there is no final fact about 
identity.  I should also note that the philosophies of personal identity and object identity are 18
different. In the metaphysics of the identity of objects in general, there is a great deal said which is 
not necessarily replicated in the literature on personal identity. It is not so much that the identity of 
objects is a superior overarching field but rather a field with different people working on it and 
different debates and elements. For this reason, it makes sense for me to focus more on personal 
identity than object identity.
Thesis structure
What this thesis sets out to achieve and where it achieves it.
The Introduction is the history of my thoughts on this topic.  
The Thesis summary explains concepts in the thesis
Part one is on identity.
In chapter one, we establish what the candidates are for personal identity: Causal history or 
Content similarity?
Chapter two sees if we can remove cause from the equation, and I achieve this using the five 
minute world thought experiment.  We also see if we can remove content from identity.  We cannot 
remove content and still retain identity. 
Part two is on what matters in future personal states.  
We talk about identity as spatiotemporal continuity and then see how this works in terms of the 
Swampman argument, where cause is absent.  We can see how the state of their content can give 
things meaning, as opposed to their prior relations (or lack of them).  We can also see how by 
 Noonan, Harold and Ben Curtis, Identity, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 18
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/identity.
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using wide content, we can overcome some of the problems that we have if we only use narrow 
content, thus ensuring that it is always content that is the determining factor, not cause.
   The specific kind of wide content being advanced is called “network identity”.  Wide content in 
general, and network identity specifically can provide a ‘further fact’ about our identity and what 
matters.
Part Three looks at some examples of theoretical situations such as time loops in order to test out 
theories of identity and what matters for survival under those conditions.
The findings of the thesis and their proofs
Because of the complexity and high level of understanding required to make sense of this thesis, I 
am much concerned that readers understand the ideas presented than I am in preserving the ideal 
academic format.  Therefore, I provide this section as a basis to understand the claims I make and 
assess their plausibility.
Claim one: Causality is not essential in personal identity.   
Academics typically see causality as extremely important in both science and philosophy to 
establish many things, including identity.  However, the fact remains that when I remove causality 
from the picture, we are still inclined to see identity in the same way.  That is, it is possible to 
describe identity without using causality, and so the concept seems to be redundant.  I do not know 
the extent of the redundancy beyond the study of identity.  Because causality is generally an 
assumed claim, there is often little to argue against.  I do my best to challenge arguments for 
causality in part one when Shoemaker argues for the inclusion of causality as an essential 
prerequisite for identity.  The claim that causal connection is not required for identity is an important 
one, but not the main thrust of this thesis. 
Claim two: A causal connection between their existence at two different points is not essential for 
a person having what matters in survival.  
    
Parfit draws a powerful distinction between the identity of a person and that person having what 
matters in survival.  Parfit convincingly claims that what matters is not preserving an individual's 
identity but rather their psychological continuity and connectedness.  Parfit is able to do this by 
comparing our preservation of identity with other normal physiological process which we find 
important and which can be substituted by other means of achieving those processes.  For 
instance, he says about someone who uses an artificial eye instead of their natural eye:
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Would this person be seeing these objects? If we insist that seeing must involve the normal cause, 
we would answer No. But even if this person cannot see, what he has is just as good as seeing, both 
as a way of knowing what is within sight, and as a source of visual pleasure. If we accept the 
Psychological Criterion, we could make a similar claim. If psychological continuity does not have its 
normal cause, it may not provide personal identity. But we can claim that, even if this is so, what it 
provides is as good as personal identity. [R&P 209]  
I accept Parfit's claim, and my further claim is that if there is no causal connection, then so long as 
there is psychological continuity and connectedness, there is what matters in survival.  Similarly, if 
a blind person is hallucinating, if that hallucination is veridical with what they would otherwise be 
seeing, then that hallucination is as good as seeing, so long as that hallucination accurately 
portraying events remains the case.  An example that I use is that if someone puts a coin into a 
drink machine and the machine malfunctions so that it does not recognise the coin, yet accepts it 
and simultaneously malfunctions so that it dispenses a drink; then the coin user is the owner of that 
drink regardless of the lack of a causal chain. 
   This would be wonderful and easy to present as my main thesis, however a philosopher called 
Scott Campbell got there first.  He imagines the situation of teleportation, and a machine holding 
information digitally about a person during the process of transportation.  If this information is 
substituted for random information, then it would not threaten what matters about survival so long 
as the information is identical.  Campbell calls this view "Psychological Sequentialism" . 19
   Regardless of finding that I am not totally original in promoting a 'sequentialist' viewpoint, 
causality's lack of importance in survival is nonetheless useful in helping to establish the main 
argument of my thesis.  That is, that what matters in survival is more than just the individual's 
connections to themselves (in the Parfitian sense, of there not needing to be an actual connection) 
but also the individual's connection to the world.
Claim three: Extrinsic (external) connections to the world are an essential part of what matters in 
individual survival. 
 
This claim is the most important one that I make because it is the most original.  That said, I am not 
the only person to claim that extrinsic properties matter in survival.  A philosopher called Heidi 
Savage also claims this; however, I believe her proofs are more dubious.  [See Chapter 5]
   In Parfit's explanation of what matters, connections between the person at different times cause 
the person to have concern for their later self.  The 'connections' are in fact a similarity of mental 
content between the two times, as opposed to 'linked' connections as we usually understand 
 Campbell, Scott. "Is Causation Necessary for What Matters in Survival?" Philosophical Studies. 126.3 19
(2005): 375-396.  [Hereafter “Campbell”, date and page number]
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connection.  In the case of external connections it is a link in the sense of another person referring 
to that person and information being able to past between them - causally or not.
   A more succinct way to understand where Parfit has gone wrong is to see that he has imported 
an extra concept in addition to what he has said is necessary for survival into his transporter 
example.  The transporter replicates a consciousness, which is the thing that Parfit says is 
important, and it replicates a body.  If it was just to transport a consciousness and leave the body, 
such as in the Christian concept of the afterlife, but also created the situation that in addition to the 
Christian concept, the consciousness could not interact with anything, then that would be 
effectively equivalent to death even though it would fully meet Parfit’s criterion for life.
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Part 1 - What does identity consist of?
Introduction
Parfit has a view of what personal identity consists of, and that is: “Psychological connectedness 
and/or continuity with the right kind of cause” [R&P216]. Yet, he mainly discusses the views of 
other writers and rarely clearly argues for his own view of what identity and personal identity are.  It 
seems that the primary purpose of Parfit’s discussion of personal identity is to establish the ground 
from which to move to talking about the thing he is mainly interested in, which is what matters in 
survival.  That is: Parfit is merely describing personal identity in order to say that personal identity 
doesn’t matter; what matters is psychological connectedness and/or continuity with any cause.
Parfit has two additions to his theory of identity:  
One is identity not taking a branching form, so that there cannot be two of the same person.  
The other is that it has the right kind of cause.
Of these, only “cause” makes its way into the account of what matters. 
  Parfit makes no specific argument for the inclusion of cause into this theory of personal identity.  
Instead, he says: “I follow Shoemaker” [R&P 516] in reference to an argument about the casual 
dependence of memories. [R&P 220].
Parfit argues that conceptually we can only remember our own memories; otherwise, they are not 
defined as memories.  Parfit then introduces the idea of “quasi-memories” solving the definitional 
problem and says they are veridical where:
(1) I seem to remember having an experience, 
(2) I did have this experience,  and 
(3) My apparent memory is causally dependent, in the normal way, on this past experience. [R&P 207]  
Because Parfit does not specifically set out a theory of why cause is important, and says he follows 
Shoemaker’s theory of why it is important, I look at Shoemaker’s theory of cause in his theory of 
identity.  Shoemaker also says similarity needs to be connected by cause and that similarity alone 
is not enough to have a theory of identity.  Because I am directly arguing that similarity over time is 
enough, that is another reason to engage with Shoemaker as opposed to Parfit at this point.
Chapter 1 - Candidates for identity description
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When talking about identity, we can see that there is often a difference in criteria between object or 
entity identity, and personal identity.  As a starting point for discussion, personal identity should 
follow the object/entity identity of the substance that the person consists of.  This is until there is a 
reason to break them apart, which is what we see when people give psychological states a greater 
level of importance than their other bodily states.
For general theories of identity, there are two likely candidates:
The Causal connection theory: Current entities and objects can only be the same entities and 
objects at a later time, as a result of the effect of the previously existing entities and objects making 
them be the way that they are.  Cause both precedes and explains subsequent effects.20
The Content similarity theory: Current entities and objects are identical with previous entities and 
objects by having deep similarity with earlier entities and objects.
It may also be claimed that both causal connection and similarity are required.
The argument against causality in identity
P1: When assigning a particular identity to entities, “causal connection” and “content similarity” are 
the two most promising candidates for providing the descriptive role.
P2: We can deprive entities and objects of causal connections without changing our description of 
their identity.
P3: We can not deprive entities and objects of similarity without changing our description of their 
identity.
Therefore: The similarity of entities and objects must be the thing that is of importance in 
describing their identity.
What is causal connection? A causal connection exists if there is a link between two states, such 
that the earlier state made the later state happen, or one entity is producing some currently 
efficacious force upon another entity, such as a person holding down a spring.
 There is one possible exception and that is backwards time travel, in which case a future cause is 20
supposed to cause a past event.
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What is content similarity? There are three kinds of content similarity that I talk about in this thesis: 
1.  Similarity in narrow content: The internal structure of a particular person or object, such that if 
those structures are duplicated, there is no way to tell between a copy and the original, apart from 
spacial position.
2.  Similarity in wide content:  Similarity in the world outside the object or entity in question.21
3.  Similarity in relational or network content:  A subset of wide content forms what I call network 
identity.   Network content that exists in relation to a particular person or object, I call its network 
identity.  i.e. its network links and the information held about it in other entities.
I examine network content later in the thesis.
Similarity and spatio-temporal continuity
My formulation of what content similarity is, in relation to identity over time, is that an object’s 
identity is formed by it being the thing that is most similar to it previously, both in spatio-temporal 
position and in internal structure.  That is, that during the next time slice, the narrow content of an 
object is as close as possible to the original object and the spatio-temporal position is as close as 
possible.  These two criteria together form the closest continuer theory.  I posit the closest 
continuer theory as our basic intuitive understanding of identity.
Similarity and spatio-temporal continuity and cause: Shoemaker
There are other candidates for what forms identity.  For example: Similarity and spatio-temporal 
continuity and cause.  That is:  Something is the same thing if it remains similar, while it follows the 
same spatio-temporal path, and the later parts of the spatio-temporal path are linked to the earlier, 
by those being the ones that cause the later parts to be as they are.
 Identity is often seen as both causal connection and content similarity.  For instance, under US copyright 21
law there is a copyright liability where a person has access to a song and produces a similar song.
So it is both potential cause and actual similarity.  This means under law that identity is determined by both 
cause and similarity.  To be clear, under the law it is only whether or not a copy has been made in some way 
that is the question. i.e cause.  However, when determining this, it is similarity that comes to the forefront. 
There can be two identical works by different authors and different rights pertaining to them so long as the 
chains of causality don’t intersect.
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  In Identity, Properties and Causality, Sydney Shoemaker argues for a view of identity as spatio-
temporal continuity linked by the right sort of causal dependence.   I accept that identity is spatio-22
temporal continuity, but reject the need for causality.
Shoemaker tries to defend the causal connection theory, whereas many other philosophers just 
presume it to be true.  Also, Shoemaker’s arguments for causality are at least coherent, whereas 
Nozick merely asserts that causality is required.   23
   In his argument for the necessity of causality, Shoemaker first of all considers what might be 
called a ‘naive’ version of content similarity, without spatiotemporal continuity.  He says, “Similarity 
is not always good evidence of identity.” [Shoemaker 324].  Shoemaker imagines a group of chairs 
painted in various colours.  Every so often, these chairs are randomly painted other, different 
colours.  By repainting the chairs, there is no link between similarity in the colours of the chairs and 
their identity as the same chair.  In the case outlined, the disconnect is between the identity of the 
colours and the identity of the chairs.  Their identity in terms of colour has changed, but not in 
terms of being the same physical chair.  His point, is to move his argument from being about 
apparent similarity to being about spatiotemporal similarity, which is a necessary refinement of the 
similarity thesis.
   Shoemaker has a second argument for the necessity of causality.  He images a machine that 
causes a table to disappear and a second machine that causes a table to be produced in the same 
place.  If the machine happens to have the same settings for the production of the new table as it 
did for the old one, then there would be a spatiotemporally continuous identical table, but it would 
be a different table. [Shoemaker 326] There are many things that I could say about this.   For 24
example, if there was a machine that could instantly replace one table with another, we would need 
to have a different understanding of identity, but as it is we don’t. Yet, I do not need to use such an 
argument with either the tables example or Shoemaker’s next theological example with God and 
stone tablets.
If we put the argument in a logical form, we can see what is wrong with it:
1. There is a table.
2.   The table disappears. 
3.   Instantly, after the table disappears, another, different table, takes its place.
4.   We know that a different table has taken its place.
 Shoemaker, Sydney, Identity, Properties and Causality, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 4, 1979 p. 321-42.22
 [Hereafter “Shoemaker” and the page number]
 Nozick, Robert, Philosophical explanations, Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1981, p.35,  23
https://antilogicalism.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/philosophical-explanations.pdf
 I could use the trick that teleosemantics uses to dismiss Swampman (or at least David Papineau uses 24
when he said “Merely Possible Cases are Irrelevant”).  
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5.   The different table is spatiotemporally continuous with the previous table.
Therefore: ’There must be more to identity than spatiotemporal continuity’.
Shoemaker defines the tables as different due to their having a different causal history, whereas 
when this claim is examined in detail, the example does not work as we shall see.  For something 
to have spatiotemporal continuity, there must be no time slice so small, that when the original 
object disappears, the new object is not there to follow on from it.  This is a fundamental problem 
for the table example because although it seems to work at first, it is not possible to imagine at an 
atomic level.
There are two problems with the table example:
First of all, there cannot be a time period, no matter how small, when there is no table there, 
because then the table would not have spatiotemporal continuity.  
Secondly, the idea that “pushing a button on the machine will cause any table at that location to 
vanish into thin air” needs explanation in physical terms.  If it was just magic, we could say that if 
magic occurs, it falsifies the theory - but magic does not occur; therefore, the theory stands.
   Shoemaker says a “machine” could theoretically do this work, so what kind of machine could it 
be?  Let us imagine that it is a machine that uses an energy beam to break down objects to their 
atomic components.  In the case of a wooden table, the atomic components would be carbon, 
hydrogen and oxygen.  Such a machine would certainly be very powerful.  It would give the 
appearance that the table had disappeared into thin air, except I imagine there would be an 
explosion as the atomic carbons reacted with the oxygen and hydrogen.  So what would really 
need to happen, would be for those atoms to be fired off at high speed away from the area.   In 
order for the carbon atoms to not explode on contact with other atoms, they would have to be 
bonded with other carbon atoms into miniature diamonds or the like.  It might still be a bit like an 
explosion.  Perhaps if the carbon was joined with the oxygen in the air to form carbon dioxide, and 
the hydrogen was bonded with oxygen in the air to form water vapour, then the table would 
effectively turn into a slightly steamy area of the room.  Of course, there can’t be a moment when it 
is just a slightly steamy area of the room, because then there would be no spatiotemporal 
continuity with a continuing table.
   There is still the problem of getting the new atoms in there to form the new table.  Those atoms 
would have to be arriving just as the old ones were leaving.  All this atomic to-ing and fro-ing is 
unsatisfactory because Shoemaker needs there to be spatiotemporal continuity without the 
existence of the same table.  If there is not continuity, then we can accurately call it a different 
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table, because there is not continuity with the old table.  Later I discuss (in the Swampman 
example) how, the atomic identity of a high-level object doesn’t affect the high-level identity of the 
object.  That being the case, let us have the machine do things differently:  The machine breaks 
the atomic bonds, as before, it then uses its own pattern to put the bonds back together, using 
those same atoms as are already there.  There is still a residual issue that there is a moment in 
time where all the atomic bonds in the table are broken, and this would count somewhat against its 
spatiotemporal continuity.
   Here is another formulation:  The machine identifies the area where the table is to be removed, 
scans the area, and then changes the atomic structure of the table as is required to create the new 
table.  As it turns out no change is required and so nothing is changed.  The table, at last, 
maintains spatiotemporal continuity, but is a ‘new table’!  
   So finally we have the logical claim that it is a new table:
If t is the time at which the buttons [on the machines] were pushed, then the nature of the table-
stages that occurred after t is due to the pushing of the button on the table producer [machine] at t, 
and not at all due to the properties of the table that was there before t; given that the button was 
pushed, we would have had such a table there after t, even if there had been no table, or a very 
different table there before.  It seems plain that in this case one table has been replaced by another.  
[Shoemaker, 326] 
In the above example, the machine has changed nothing about the table, as that would violate its 
spatiotemporal continuity.  But now, it is still being claimed that the table’s continued existence is 
not due to its continuous nature, but rather to the activities of the machine.  If no table had been 
there, the machine might have formed a table out of ‘thin air’ using the carbon, oxygen and 
hydrogen atoms in the air, but this has no impact on the existence of the same table.  We must 
achieve the first step in the argument before the next part works.  Shoemaker needs to find a way 
of creating a change consistent with the table having spatiotemporal continuity, without using 
magic.  Shoemaker’s solution is… A miracle occurring, as shown by Shoemaker’s next example, 
which is the idea of God deciding that: 
…at a certain time a certain object - let it be a stone tablet - will disappear into thin air then…he 
issues another decree, this one to the effect that at that time there will come into existence at a 
certain place a stone tablet of a certain description - and by coincidence the place and description 
are precisely those of the existing tablet at the time of its agreed annihilation. … 
What our deity has inadvertently done is to replace one tablet with another just like it, and in such a 
way as to preserve spatiotemporal continuity. [Shoemaker, 326-7] 
That is what Shoemaker describes the deity as doing, except there are a couple of problems.
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1st.  It relies on a miracle occurring, which is much more than even an extremely improbable event 
requires.
2nd. If the sequence of events described by Shoemaker actually did occur, and we didn’t have 
access to the divine, then there would be no physical way to verify that anything had happened.  
Therefore it is not verifiable in scientific terms.
3rd. As a logical argument, the conclusion that God has replaced “one tablet with another just like 
it” does not follow, except by definition, from the premises of the following argument:
P1: A stone tablet disappears.
P2: A stone tablet appears.
P3: The second tablet is different to the first tablet.
P4: There is spatiotemporal continuity.
Therefore:  There can be a change in identity while preserving spatiotemporal continuity.
Firstly, I would accept the claim there is spatiotemporal continuity.  With P1 it is said that a stone 
tablet disappears, but it does not ‘disappear’ in any ordinary sense, because there is no way to 
detect any change.  At the point that it ‘disappears’ nothing seems to change.  Similarly, when the 
next one appears, there is no apparent change.  Then we have the claim that the second tablet is 
different from the first.  It is only supposedly different because Shoemaker said that it is different, 
which is the very claim up for discussion.
   I would say briefly that we may have a concept of something, such as imaging that a person can 
fly by flapping their arms, but the imaginative concept does not present a challenge to physics 
when discussing the reality of human life.
An argument about the difficulty of presenting cause as necessary, is that if I argue that if causality 
is something that is uniquely required by identity, then it should be easy to show that it is so.  It 
should not need any elaborate science fiction or theological examples to prove that cause is 
necessary.  Most philosophers seem to take it as obviously being the case that causality is 
necessary, but when it comes time to prove that this is the case, then there is difficulty proving it.  




In this chapter, we have seen that philosophers can propose either similarity or cause as 
fundamental to identity.  We have seen that it is challenging to prove the existence of cause as 
being of importance in identity, although it is widely assumed to have such importance.  Therefore 
we can see that the claim that causality is important in understanding identity is severely 
weakened.
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Chapter 2 - Can we remove cause, or remove content?
If causality is not essential in identity, we should be able to remove causality and still have the 
same identity understanding as before.  This chapter finds if we can achieve that by introducing 
three arguments.  Below is the second part of the argument previously presented:
P2: We can deprive entities and objects of causal connections without changing our 
description of their identity.
In order to see if causality is necessary to identity, I use Russell’s “five minute world” example.  
This example is a crucial step in removing causal history from being conceptually necessary to 
identity.
Argument 1: The consequences of a five minute world
P1: The world in its current form could have been created five minutes ago.
P2: If the world in its current form was created five minutes ago, we would not propose a change in 
the identity of things around us.
Therefore: The difference between the world being created five minutes ago, and the world having 
its currently assumed age is not a conceptually necessary one for the assignment of identity.
Furthermore: If the world being created five minutes ago, and having it’s currently assumed age 
cannot be a relevant one identity wise, then prior causal history cannot be a relevant factor in 
identity.
The first premise we must examine is, P1: The universe in it’s current form could have been 
created five minutes ago.  Russell’s text on that I will quote in length because Russell is a famous 
proponent of the five minute hypothesis as a sceptical hypothesis:
In investigating memory-beliefs, there are certain points which must be borne in mind. In the first 
place, everything constituting a memory-belief is happening now, not in that past time to which the 
belief is said to refer. It is not logically necessary to the existence of a memory-belief that the event 
remembered should have occurred, or even that the past should have existed at all. There is no 
logical impossibility in the hypothesis that the world sprang into being five minutes ago, exactly as it 
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then was, with a population that "remembered" a wholly unreal past. There is no logically necessary 
connection between events at different times; therefore nothing that is happening now or will happen 
in the future can disprove the hypothesis that the world began five minutes ago. Hence the 
occurrences which are called knowledge of the past are logically independent of the past; they are 
wholly analysable into present contents, which might, theoretically, be just what they are even if no 
past had existed. I am not suggesting that the non-existence of the past should be entertained as a 
serious hypothesis. Like all sceptical hypotheses, it is logically tenable, but uninteresting. All that I 
am doing is to use its logical tenability as a help in the analysis of what occurs when we remember.  25
To discuss, I will go through the argument line by line:
R. P1: “…everything constituting a memory-belief is happening now, not in that past time to which
the belief is said to refer.”
This, I think, is an uncontroversial premise.
R. P2:  “It is not logically necessary to the existence of a memory-belief that the event remembered 
should have occurred, or even that the past should have existed at all.”
I would say; Never mind logically necessary it is not even physically necessary, that the event 
remembered should have occurred.  However, we may get into a semantic issue if people choose 
to define memory in causal terms.  It might be claimed, for instance, that if the event did not occur, 
then it is not actually a memory, but has some other epistemic classification, such as where Parfit 
talks about quasi-memories. [R&P 220]  In terms of the necessity of the past having existed at all, 
this is also a disputed concept - for instance, with Davidson, in terms of the Swampman 
hypotheses, which we will deal with later.  It may be physically, but not logically necessary that the 
past exists, but this is not really an issue from our point of view.
R. P3: There is no logical impossibility in the hypothesis that the world sprang into being five 
minutes ago, exactly as it then was, with a population that "remembered" a wholly unreal past.  26
 Russell, Bertrand. The Analysis of Mind, The Floating Press, 2008. Ebook, p. 203. https://ebookcentral-25
proquest-com.ezproxy.otago.ac.nz/lib/otago/detail.action?docID=432353
 In fact Quantum Physics describes it a physically possible.  For example the Boltzmann brain hypotheses.26
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Some might be dispute this.  It certainly might be thought that it is physically impossible for the 
world to spring into existence in that way out of nothing, although there may be some quantum 
phenomena that could bring such a thing about.   Whether it is logically possible is a fairly low bar.27
If it was the whole universe that was to spring into existence we get into multiple difficulties.
   The most fundamental logical difficulty is that if the universe was to come into existence from 
nothing we would have to say that at ‘time 1’ nothing existed, then at ‘time 2’ the universe existed 
as it was five minutes ago.  But it is not clear how we get from nothing to something.  Another 
potential problem is that if the universe as it is now came into existence five minutes ago, then the 
theory of relativity would predict that it also existed before that since time is not a constant:
As Einstein remarked: 
For us physicists, the distinction between past, present and future is only an illusion, however 
persistent”, and these concepts really do not figure at all in special relativity.  28
So for the universe to come into existence a few minutes ago may not make sense from a physics 
point of view, but for the Earth to come into existence in that way would make more sense.  Even 
that has problems though.  If the Earth suddenly popped into existence in its present orbit around 
the sun, this would no doubt create immense gravitational disturbances on the other inner planets.  
What would be better is if there was an equivalent mass in place of the Earth five minutes ago, and 
then it was shaped into the Earth at that time.  A ‘swamp-world’ hypothesis if you will .  It would 29
also solve the puzzle of why other intelligent life in the universe has not contacted us. - We haven’t 
been here long enough.30
R. P4: “There is no logically necessary connection between events at different times; therefore, 
nothing that is happening now or will happen in the future can disprove the hypothesis that the 
world began five minutes ago.”
It is difficult to prove a negative.  Whether or not this claim is true or not does not matter for my 
purposes.  Of more interest is that it could be discovered that a world did begin five minutes ago.  
 Boltzmann brains are also a possibility but they suffer from some of the same problems as idealism.  Much 27
better to have the whole world pop into existence.
 Einstein’s letter of March 1955, http://www.physicsoftheuniverse.com/topics_relativity_spacetime.html28
 See Discussion of Donald Davidson’s Swampman elsewhere in this thesis29
 As well as a ‘mass quantum event’ we could imagine the situation where there was the big bang which 30
then caused matter to randomly coalesce into the form we see currently without the normal causal processes 
being in play.
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For instance, in terms of the simulation movie “The Matrix” - The matrix is turned on, and then five 
minutes later there is the situation that the apparent world began five minutes ago.
Even within the context of our own planet starting its existence five minutes ago, we could soon 
discover (for instance, from an alien civilisation watching us, or from our own observations) that 
actually the planet began its existence five minutes ago - or whatever the relevant timeframe was.
R. P5: “Hence the occurrences which are called knowledge of the past are logically independent of 
the past; they are wholly analysable into present contents, which might, theoretically, be just what 
they are even if no past had existed."
Above is a critical passage.  It is a bit difficult to understand, but the basic point seems to be that 
things could be exactly the same, even if there was no actual past.  But more importantly, by his 
emphasis on the word “called”, Russell seems to be saying that what we think is knowledge is not 
infact knowledge.
So where to from here?  If we amend argument 1 to:
Argument 1.1: The consequences of a five minute world, updated
P1: The Earth in its current form could have been created five minutes ago.
P2: If the Earth in its current form was created five minutes ago, we would not change how we live.
Therefore:
C: The difference between the Earth being created five minutes ago, and having its currently 
assumed age cannot be a behaviourally relevant one.
We have been through Premise 1 of 1.1.  Premise 2 is a more speculative endeavour.
If the earth in its current form was created five minutes ago, we would not change how we live.
First of all, I am sure that it would be universally agreed that if no one knew that the world had 
been created five minutes ago, then it would not affect how people behave.  The only question is 
what difference it would make if they did know.  Only humans could have the capacity to know and 
understand such a situation.  Therefore, only humans could be affected by that knowledge.  Other 
creatures would continue on as before.
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   On the face of it, a revelation that the world had only been created five minutes ago would cause 
a complete breakdown of society, because everything is supposedly based on prior events with a 
certain causal history.  For instance, the laws having been passed through parliament etc.
However, if everything was to be simply redefined in terms of things being causally and content-
wise as if the earlier events had happened, then meaning could be brought to the situation and the 
crisis averted. So in that instance we could say:  There is no past, but everything exists as if there 
is a past. Therefore; We will continue to act as if there is a past.  Given that the alternative was 
societal breakdown, when a perfectly suitable means of avoiding the societal breakdown existed, 
surely we would wish to avoid societal breakdown?  It is of course possible that someone could 
‘bite the bullet’ and prefer societal breakdown to what they may regard as ‘living a lie’, but I do not 
regard this as a rational option.
Argument 2:  The difference in the five minute earth is cause not 
content
We still need something else to link the argument together.  That is, that it is actually content 
similarity which remains with the five minute earth, but not causal history.
P1: If the world was created five minutes ago, it would have all the same content as it does now.
P2: If the world was created five minutes ago, it would have a different causal history than it does 
now.
Therefore: The difference between a world created five minutes ago and its currently assumed age 
is its causal history.
With Argument 2, Premise 1, I see no reason to challenge that the content would be any different.  
With Argument 2, Premise 2; If the world was created five minutes ago, it would have a different 
history i.e. it would lack the current history.
Content similarity over time - Sealing off one possible objection.
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One possible objection  to a five minute world would be that if a dispute arose about what 31
happened in the faux past, then it would be in essence unresolvable.  There would only be the past 
in terms of current evidence about the past - in terms of information in the world now.  That is all 
we have to access the past.  But someone might imagine using a time machine to go back and 
check on a historical event.  Since there would be no time to go back to, there is at least one 
consequence of the five minute world premise: Somewhat less enjoyment of the Back to the Future 
movie series. This might be presented as a counterfactual of the counterfactual; That being, that 
one loses something from being in a five minute world - the conceptual possibility of time travel 
back into the past.
Argument 3 - The five minute world and the possibility of time travel
P1: If the Earth was five minutes old, time travel to an earlier age of the Earth would not be even 
logically possible.
P2: The logical possibility of travel to an earlier age of the Earth exists in the current Earth.
Therefore: We lose at least one thing in the present by the Earth being only five minutes old.
This is a problem because what we want is for the five minute Earth to be functionally the same as 
the current Earth - for all the current things to make sense.  It makes sense to be an historian 
because all the same resources are still there.  It makes sense to be an archaeologist because the 
Earth can still yield its ‘secrets’ as before. But alas, it does not make sense to be working on time 
travel back into the past, because there is nothing there. - No Earth at least.  Someone might use 
this to argue that we are worse off in the five minute world, and therefore content is not all that 
matters. This can be solved by having content similarity over time, in terms of any number of 
continuous five minute worlds, causally unconnected and popping in and out of existence, with a 
tiny gap between them.  So even if you were to go back in time into the gap, it would be an 
unnoticeably short period of time until another universe came into existence to take its place.  So if 
someone is to go back in time they find themselves in one of these worlds and content is 
preserved in the current world.
   However, someone might say: What is the meaning of this?  It is bad enough to accept one five 
minute world as a thought experiment, but how can we accept multiple, causally unconnected five 
minute worlds popping in and out of existence?  How likely is that?  I would say that it is somewhat 
 Another possible objection that someone could give is that causal history is still of the most importance, as 31
the content similarity is only in terms of the causal history.  i.e. if we ask: Content similarity with what?  It is 
with what would have happened if there had been the causal history; therefore, the causal history is still the 
most important, even in its absence.
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unlikely, but if we see time travel as a possibility and think we may be missing out on the fruits of it 
in a five minute world scenario, and thus see the five minute world as a poorer and more restricted 
world because only content - not cause, is taken account of, then this solves that scenario.  Since 
time-travel back into the past is potentially even less likely than multiple, unconnected five minute 
worlds, it should not matter about the likelihood. 
   Someone could object that if we knew the world to be a five minute world - even with causally 
unconnected content similarity (which could be known as “content continuity”).  It would create 
problems and differences in how we see things. Yet ultimately, it is not the lack of cause that 
creates the problem but knowing about the lack of cause.  Removing causal history does not 
change anything in how we act, and how we think about things, but as soon as we know about the 
lack of cause, then that seems like an issue to people if they have already decided that cause is 
important.  If we did not think cause was important, it would not seem important.
The five minute world scenario works to show us that causality is not naturally important to us.  The 
only thing that would make us act differently if the five minute world was the real world, is if we 
knew about it, but that is just valuing cause regardless of its actual effect.  The only objection that 
can get traction is that time travel back into the past becomes impossible in the five minute world 
scenario, but this can be resolved by having a number of causally unconnected five minute worlds 
in series, so that in fact, the same kind of historical content does exist in time.
Can we remove content?
It is now time to examine whether content can be removed without identity being affected.  To do 
this, it requires that we are able to remove all content and have something regarded as being the 
same thing.  Restating premise three from chapter 1:
P3: We can not deprive entities and objects of content similarity without changing our 
description of their identity.
It is difficult to think of examples whereby something could have content similarity totally removed 
and still be considered as the being the same thing.  In a partial sense it is easier, as on the face of 
it, we can demonstrably change the content similarity of entities and objects without changing their 
basic identity.  For instance, we can take a coin and scratch it and still have it accepted as a coin.
   Throughout their life, a person changes in their similarity to at previous times, but they typically 
go by the same name.  If we have a person named “Ben” for instance, when Ben is a baby he is 
called “Ben”, and when he is old he is also called “Ben”.  Yet every known change in content 
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changes the overall description of the entity.  What was previously an unmarked coin, is now a coin 
with a scratch.  What was previously young Ben, is now old Ben.
Component parts assembled into the same design
When the same component parts are assembled into the same design, we typically say that it is 
the same object.  But we may not.
   Let’s say that Divesh gets a lego set and builds a truck, “Divesh’s truck”.  Then the truck is taken 
apart and Norman comes along.  Norman then gets the same lego set and builds the same truck, 
“Norman’s truck”.  Is it the same truck?  Someone might argue that although identical, the trucks 
are different, and their difference is a causal one.  Divesh caused one truck to be built, and 
Norman caused the next truck to be built.  But if we did not wish to include cause, then it would 
also be possible to say that the trucks existed at different spatiotemporal points and that is the 
difference between them.
   So how do we get identity in this case: Through cause or spatiotemporally?  The question then 
would be whether it would be possible for the truck to have the same identity without cause, or 
without it existing spatiotemporally.  It certainly would be difficult for the truck to have the same 
identity without existing spatiotemporally. 
   What if when Norman received the truck set; he started to construct it, and an alien force 
possessed his arms and the lego pieces, so that as he moved to make the truck, his arms and 
hands were moving in parallel with his thoughts and the pieces were moving around without him 
actually touching them (although he thought he was)?  So at the end of the process, the truck was 
built exactly as before, but without any actual causal link between Norman and its construction.  In 
that case we would have the same result, but without the causal link, so it seems we do not really 
need it.
   What about if we were to have the situation where, when he is given the lego set, Norman does 
not actually build the truck, but only imagines that he has built it?  What if then everyone has 
exactly the same thoughts about the imaginary truck as they would have had about the real one? 
Could we then say that the truck has the same identity without existing spatiotemporally?
   Let us imagine, for instance, that Norman goes home and his mother says: “What did you do?”.  
Norman says, “I built a truck”, and everyone has the same thoughts as they would have had in the 
first version of the example but without any apparent content that they refer to.  What is the identity 
of the truck?  Here, it seems like the identity reduces down to content similarity of description.  
Without cause or spatiotemporal substance, all we have left as its identity is its description. 
Identical identity requires the content of identical descriptive thoughts.
Part 1 conclusion
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Part one of this thesis is on what identity is.  I have examined various scenarios in order to see 
what is essential to identity, to find what identity consists of.  I have found that we can remove 
cause from the world and still have the parts of the world retain their identity, but we cannot remove 
content and still retain identity.  Therefore, only content similarity is necessary for identity, not 
causal history.
Part 2 - What matters?
Once we have worked out what identity consists of, we need to know what matters for us regarding 
future states.  Is it the preservation of identity or something else?  My answer is that it is content 
similarity, but not content similarity as the (content similarity) closest continuing thing on the 
spatiotemporal path, as is identity, but rather an area of content similarity anywhere in the 
spatiotemporal dimension, where the same network identity still holds.  Furthermore, this content 
similarity should be as ‘wide’ as possible.  I call this ‘point to point’ content similarity.  Where we 
have the situation of seeking a ‘further fact’ about what matters after that, we are most likely to find 
it outside the range of narrow content, and in the content identifiers used to identify it out in the 
wide content world, i.e. its network identity.
   While there may be a ‘further fact’ which helps determine intuitive identity, there is no ‘final fact’ 
which determines absolute identity in two non-identical situations.  However, a further fact may be 
a relative fact about reference to the object in question.
Why use the term ‘what matters’?
When saying “what matters” in this thesis, I am referring to ‘what matters in survival’. 
  Using various examples, Parfit prises what matters in survival away from strict identity relation in 
terms of cause.  One example is an imaginary teleporter which destroys someone’s body and 
recreates a replica elsewhere.  This is different from another possible imagined teleporter that 
would break apart someone at an atomic level and beam those atoms elsewhere for reassembly.  
Under a Parfitian framework, these two cases would be seen as equivalent in the result they 
achieved.
   If the way a teleporter worked was to scan and send only the information, while the original 
person was left, then under Parfit’s philosophy, that would be just as good as if the person travelled 
in the regular way.  If, as under Parfit’s example, someone is left alive for a short period of time 
after they have been scanned, then this is called ‘being on the branchline’.  The replicated person 
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is on the ‘mainline’, and they are the one to which concern need be directed.  The person on the 
branchline has no rational reason to feel concerned.  Any such fear is like a fear of heights or some 
other irrational fear.  Believing that there are legitimate reasons for concern in such a scenario is 
called the further fact view.
   I am attempting to prove that causal connection is not important in survival but that there is a 
further fact, and that is identity within the network. So my first task is to prove that causal 
connection does not matter in survival but that social or network connection does. 
  So first up is proving that causal connection does not matter.
Chapter 3 - The proposal that content similarity is what matters 
In order to see that content similarity is what matters and not causal connection, we have to bear in 
mind the lesson of the five minute world, which is that it would not affect our behaviour if the world 
turned out to be a five minute world.  The example of Swampman is an instance of a ‘five minute 
person’ with a random cause.  If we accept Swampman as being the person, or as good as the 
person, then it would show that what we care about is content and not cause.  I argue that whether 
or not Swampman is the person, they are as good as the person.
Example: Randomly created content - Swampman 
Swampman is an example created by Donald Davidson in order to advance a particular 
thesis about meaning.  I am using the example to talk about identity, and what matters, 
since in the example he makes claims about identity as well as meaning.  The example is 
described like this:
Suppose lightning strikes a dead tree in a swamp; I am standing nearby. My body is reduced to its 
elements, while entirely by coincidence (and out of different molecules) the tree is turned into my 
physical replica. My replica, The Swampman, moves exactly as I did; according to its nature it departs 
the swamp, encounters and seems to recognize my friends, and appears to return their greetings in  
English. It moves into my house and seems to write articles on radical interpretation. No one can tell the 
difference.  32
 Davidson, Donald. Knowing One's Own Mind, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical 32
Association, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Jan., 1987), pp. 441-458, American Philosophical Association, http://
www.jstor.org/stable/3131782
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Swampman is a very important example in understanding the nature of identity, and yet it 
has not generally been used as such.  This is not to say that the same kind of issue has 
not been considered separate from the swampman example.  For example Nozick says:
As you die, a very improbable random event occurs elsewhere in the universe: Molecules come 
together precisely in the configuration of your brain and a very similar (but healthier) body, exhibiting 
complete psychological similarity to you. 
   This is not you; though it resembles you, by hypothesis it does not arise out of you.  It is not any 
continuer of you.  In earlier cases, by psychological continuity I meant ”stemming from” and “similar to” 
of course, we can have the first without the second, as when drastic changes in psychology are 
brought on by physical injury or emotional trauma; case 7 shows the second without the first.  33
So Swampman is like the Nozick example, except there is not the huge spatial gap 
between ourselves and the randomly cohering being in the Davidson example.  I suspect 
that this gap is in order to create further intuitive distance between ourselves and the 
randomly cohering being.  Davidson attempts (bizarrely, in my opinion) to create this kind 
of intuitive distance by saying about Swampman’s creation it is “out of different molecules” 
as if specific molecules could be the ‘carrier’ of identity and in this case, meaning.
   I see the Swampman example as giving one of the clearest examples of why it is content 
similarity that carries identity, and what matters, and not causal history that creates it, but it 
was intended as an example to illustrate the exact opposite.  I don’t blame Davidson for 
this, in fact I celebrate it.  It reminds me of another famous case regarding Einstein and 
quantum entanglement related by way of (lack of) causality: 
“The notion that randomness, indeed absence of causality, lies at the heart of things is unsettling in the 
extreme, and there’s some comfort in seeing that Einstein shared our instinctive reluctance to 
countenance it.”  34
 
“If Einstein isn’t always afforded due praise, however, that is at least understandable.  For he 
‘discovered’ entanglement via a thought experiment, that because it posed an apparent paradox, 
demonstrated in his view that such behaviour couldn’t possibly be real.  Einstein wanted to bury 
entanglement even as he unveiled it.” [Ball, Beyond Weird. p162] 
Swampman, meaning and value
 Nozick, Robert. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1981, p.41.33
 Ball, Philip. Beyond Weird. The Bodley Head, London, 2018, p.161.34
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Davidson says about the creation of a ‘Swampman' replica:
My replica can't recognize my friends; it can't recognize anything, since it never cognized anything in 
the first place. It can't know my friends' names (though of course it seems to); it can't remember my 
house. It can't mean what I do by the word ‘house’, for example, since the sound ‘house’ Swampman 
makes was not learned in a context that would give it the right meaning—or any meaning at all. Indeed, 
I don't see how my replica can be said to mean anything by the sounds it makes, nor to have any 
thoughts.  35
Swampman is an argument against content similarity as a main criterion of value, where value is 
taken to be meaning.  The reason for this is that we have content similarity, but there is proposed 
to be no meaning and presumably no value.
  The Swampman argument is false and it is easy for me to see why, but the problem is that where 
the value of meaning is in its meaning something to somebody, if someone simply denies the 
meaning they can maintain the argument.   The argument is supposed to work by saying that 36
since meaning is often thought to be derived by causal connection, once that connection is broken 
there is no meaning able to be derived or generated.  Even if there is apparently ‘meaning’.
   I take it to be a natural and uncontroversial extension of the Swampman argument regarding 
meaning, that the swampman is not seen objectively to have the same identity as the original 
person, regardless of whether he appears to have that identity.  This obviously goes for having 
what matters about them also.  I maintain that the swampman may not have the same identity as 
per definition in the example: “My body is reduced to its elements” but that the swampman has 
what matters about the person.  It is, in Parfitian terms “as good as ordinary survival”.
Supposed counterexamples to Swampman’s identical rights
Let us take a look at some examples where being identical alone does not seem to be enough to 
maintain all of what matters about a person.  
   For instance, let us imagine something like the famous Twin Earth example but less complicated:  
On Earth we have Jim, who when he was born was born in what is called a “line house” on the 
 Davidson, Donald. Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective: Philosophical Essays Volume 3. Oxford: Oxford 35
University Press, 2001. Print ISBN-13: 9780198237532, Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 
2003, DOI: 10.1093/0198237537.001.0001
 There is another aspect to this and that is that it adds something to Descartes meditation on first 36
philosophy in that if Davidson is correct we can know if we are Swampmen right now.  Just think “I think 
therefore I am".  If you can achieve that then you’re not a Swampman, because a Swampman would, by 
Davidson’s understanding not be able to think it.  Therefore, by that rationale there is something else that we 
can fundamentally know other than that there is a thinker - that the thinker has not randomly coalesced.
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American/Canadian border.  Jim's mother gave birth on the American side of the border.  Jim on 
twin Earth is currently physically identical to Jim on Earth, except when he was born his mother 
gave birth on the other side of the house, on the Canadian border side.  The Jim’s don’t know this 
however, they both presume they were born on the American side of the border and are American 
citizens.  The fact remains that though they are physically identical and their worlds are currently 
physically identical (By some kind of confluence of physical events), when one says that they are 
American one is telling the truth and the other telling a falsehood.  Although currently identical, a 
different causal history accords each one of them different rights.  One brother can legally run for 
president and one can not, for instance.
   It then stands to reason that if there is an identical swampman replica of Jim, and separately an 
identical swampman replica of twin Earth Jim, that the swamp man could not have any citizenship 
at all, because being identical alone could not mean anything in terms of citizenship rights.
   Here’s another example:  Let’s say that there is a murder, and the police are looking for the 
murder weapon which is the crucial evidence in the case.  They recover the weapon they are 
looking for, but on the way back to the station, with said weapon, the police car crashes and 
catches fire so that the weapon is destroyed.  Could the police then go down to a local gun shop, 
purchase an identical firearm and present that to the jury, say it is the murder weapon and get a 
conviction?  We would surely regard that as gross police misconduct.  So it looks like we have a 
class of things, which are true of those things alone and not of objects that are physically identical 
to them.  It looks like content similarity as a sole criterion of value is in trouble.  But is it?  There are 
two ways to solve these problems.  One is by reasonableness with regard to the narrow content, 
and the other is by wide content.
Reasonableness and how selection creates meaning
The concept of ‘selection’, as described below, creates a mechanism whereby randomly created 
content can still have the same meaning as causally created content.  That mechanism is selection 
on the basis that the content is the same as causally created content.
   In the realm of computers, it is typical to take a copy of something to have all the veracity of the 
original.  Nothing is gained from having the original.  In practical terms, content similarity seems to 
be all when it comes to computer files.
   Normally, we agree that when a text is copied, the copy takes on the causal history of the 
original.  If we did not think that, then plagiarism would be acceptable.  Under that scenario, 
someone could plagiarise, and the act of copying would sever the causal history of the copy from 
the original.
   In other cases of manufacture, there may be no ‘original’ as such.  I may hold up a first edition of 
a book and say “I don’t want this copy of the book, I want the ‘original’.  Not the manuscript, but the 
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original book”.  In that case, there is no original.  There is the first book to be manufactured, but 
that is seen as irrelevant, and it does not typically have any greater value than the rest of the books 
manufactured at that time.  So wanting the ‘original’ of a book is just unreasonable.  
   What about a ‘swampbook’?  In this case, we don’t have to speak of a book found in a swamp, 
because of the use of computers.  Imagine that lightning hits a computer, and there is a power 
surge that causes a corrupted document file.  In this case, the corrupted file happens to be 
identical in content to an already published ebook.  In that case, the ‘swamp ebook’ would not have 
the causal history of an ordinary ebook, and so under the Davidson schema it could not ‘mean 
anything’ or have any of the copyright implications of the ordinary ebook.  This could provide an 
opportunity for something called “swampware”.  
   Swampware would be a kind of software that randomly generates computer files with random 
characters and spaces in them, and then compares them against existing files.  When it finds a 
match, then bingo!  The user has what they want in terms of the value of the text.  We can imagine 
a computer that works incredibly quickly, so a program is run and it starts outputting swamp 
ebooks, webpages, images, and computer code:  All copyright free!  This seems to present a major 
issue.  It seems like it would be difficult at this point to maintain the intuition that the swamptext has 
no meaning.  It just seems like a convenient way to get past the copyright laws.  What is it about 
the swampware program that allows it to create useful documents?  It seems like the process that 
creates it is the selection of randomly generated text against the original.  But if swamptext has no 
meaning to begin with, how can selection assign it meaning?  Well, just as other identical things 
can have facts about them, so can swamptext have a fact assigned to it.  That fact is that it is 
identical to text with a causal history and should be treated as such - not to do so would be absurd.  
People can deny that if they wish.  If they deny it it suggests they would permit the generation of 
their works by means of a swampware program.
   To further extend the example, let us imagine that it is not text that we are creating, but human 
beings.  A machine is quickly creating swampmen and comparing them against the original.  It is 
then destroying them unless they match.  We then have the same situation with the swampmen as 
with the swamptext.  But this swampman is in the same situation as the original Davidson 
swampman.  The only difference is that with this swampman he is retained by virtue of similarity 
with Davidson, as opposed to just being created and happening to be identical.  It is not a 
significant difference.  Of course with the original swampman, the only reason that his friends and 
acquaintances take him seriously is that he looks and acts as Davidson.  So that is a kind of 
selection.  If it was just some monster crawling out of the swamp then there would be no issue to 
begin with.  So for Davidson to maintain that the swampman has no meaning, he would have to 
maintain that swamptext has no meaning and anything that is randomly created has no meaning, 
and that has real-world effects as we have seen.
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   If we go back to the citizenship case where two physically identical people have different 
citizenships:  If there is a swampman replica of either person, the citizenship would have to be 
indeterminate.  But that is only because the criterion of citizenship is unreasonable to begin with.  
This is just like how two Australian senators resigned because of the unreasonable citizenship 
criterion that applied to them in the Australian constitution.37
   In the case of the murder weapon example it would be completely reasonable to provide a 
perfect copy of the murder weapon - either a swamp copy or a copy via causal means, if the 
ambiguity in the original example was removed.  For instance, if the police could attend a crime 
scene and take an atomic level scan of the evidence at the scene, then if the original evidence was 
discarded or destroyed the copy would be good evidence.  This is just as crime scene photos are 
good evidence - they are not the original crime scene.  
   There is a famous murder case in New Zealand where a lot of the evidence centred around the 
rifle used for the killings.  Imagine that the police did an atomic level scan of the Bain  crime 38
scene, and they were able to draw down that information and produce an atomic replica of the rifle 
used in the Bain family murders on demand for court cases.  In that case the replica would be of 
more value and use than the original rifle, which may lose some of its value as evidence after 
repeated handling and the natural degradation that comes with age, over time.
   We have seen that when we select a randomly generated replica of a person or thing against the 
original, it is as good as the original or a causally created copy.  It is just another means of doing 
the same thing, and it is only reasonable to see copies in the same light as their originals so long 
as they are exact copies.
Random signs and selections
Davidson says: “I don't see how my replica can be said to mean anything by the sounds it makes”.  
This is a very important point, and the question is: Can randomly created messages mean 
anything?  I say they can, where their content and context are the same as a ‘causally’ created 
message, or via selection.
Positive selection
 Karp, Paul. Australia citizenship crisis reignites as senator and four MPs quit, The Guardian, 9 May 2018. 37
https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/may/09/australia-citizenship-crisis-reignites-as-senator-
and-four-mps-quit
 The Bain murders were a famous New Zealand crime where there was a problem determining whether the 38
son or the father did the crime of killing the rest of the family.
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Imagine this scenario:  There is a metal panel with plastic letters with magnets on them that can be 
arranged in any particular way.  If a young (pre-literate) child of two plays with the letters and 
makes a word, or even a sentence, then we would not say that they mean it.  The child cannot 
mean anything by what he or she might ‘write’ on the board by playing with it.  If the child writes a 
swear word, for instance, we should not get angry with them.  The child is in the same position with 
regards to meaning that Davidson says swampman is.  However, that does not mean that the 
words the child 'writes' cannot have any meaning per se.  If the child randomly writes a swear word 
and we take a photo of it and post it on someone’s door, then that has meaning.  We have given it 
meaning by our actions in selection.  In this case, a positive action creates the selection.
Negative selection
Consider another case:  A lift repair technician has a sign in his bag which says “Danger! lift out of 
order.”  In this example, the lift repair technician has a dental appointment after work with his son in 
a high rise building.  While he is waiting for the appointment in the building, his young son takes his 
sign out of his bag and places it in front of one of the lifts.  The sign says, “Lift out of order” The 
father sees this and takes no action, so people start to avoid using the lift. 
   Is the off duty lift technician in any way liable for this inconvenience?  I believe the answer is 
“yes” because by leaving up the randomly placed sign, he is sending the message that the lift is 
not functional when he believes that it is.  So this would form a kind of negative selection. Where a 
randomly placed sign is left in place, although no action is taken, the lack of action is the action. 
   With Swampman, meaning is even more fundamental.  It is not just that we give the utterances of 
Swampman meaning by selection, they have meaning themselves by virtue of the initial conditions 
of the example as Davidson constructs it - that being the output of the brain of a human duplicate.
   So if a lift technician is standing outside a lift, warning people not to use it, and he is hit by 
lightning and replaced by an identical swampman doing the same thing, then we should treat the 
warnings of the swamp technician with due regard.  It is incredible to me that anyone could say 
otherwise.  It is the very fact that he is identical that is the issue.  It is definitional.  If another 
identical thing replaces anything with meaning, then that identical thing has the same meaning by 
virtue of its identicality.
We can set the argument up like so:
Premise 1: A lift technician is standing outside a lift, warning people whether the lift is safe to use.
Premise 2: The lift technician is replaced by an identical ‘swamp technician’.
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Premise 3: We know the above.
Proposition 1: If we give an utterance serious regard, then it has meaning.
Proposition 2: We would give the warnings of the swamp technician due regard.
Therefore; The swamp technician means something by the sounds he makes.
Importantly, it is not just because we had selected and created meaning like in the child’s letter 
pattern situation, which always had meaning to begin with, by means of its identical nature.
   It could be that none of this matters to some people - that they are such a follower of Davidson 
that they are willing to step into the lift to their doom, regardless of the desperate pleas of the 
swamp-technician.  If this is the case, there are still further problems that await such a person.
Non-causal infection
If we have a swampman go out into the world and partake in normal activities of work and leisure, 
then, if we are to take cause seriously as the only source of meaning and value, we have a 
problem that arises from one randomly created being not having the right kind of causal history as 
part of the causal chain in general.  The argument is simply that if one part of the causal chain 
does not have the right causal history to be legitimate, then none of the resultant parts of the chain 
are legitimate.  For instance, if there is a swampman whose job was working for a bank and he had 
to make decisions about who would be lent money, then from the causalist’s point of view, those 
transactions would be equivalent to a bank error, and the bank would be justified in asking for the 
money back.  If someone went to a furniture store and selected a bed from a swamp-salesperson 
who said that he would help them take it out to the car and then they could go back inside and pay 
for it.  That would be shoplifting because they had taken the bed out of the store without 
permission and without paying for it.  If the apparent head of state was a swamp-person then none 
of the laws would be legitimate because they would not have been signed by the head of state.  
These are just some auxiliary problems with having a swamp-person in a causal chain from the 
causalist’s perspective.
Wide content
The second way we can address the issue with Swampman is by using wide content.  Wide 
content means the content that is beyond just the individual.
 48
   If we have Jim, who is an American citizen by birth and a newly created duplicate of Jim, then it 
might be reasonable to say that Jim is an American citizen, whereas Jim’s duplicate does not have 
any citizenship at all - unless by ‘birth’ we mean wherever Jim’s duplicate was created, which might 
be America or even such an unlikely country as New Zealand. 
   In any event, Jim’s duplicate cannot duplicate the citizenship of Jim, by how we normally decide 
citizenship.  It seems like it might be unreasonable to decide citizenship in that way, but that is how 
it is.  Regardless of that however, a causal link is not actually required in order for Jim’s duplicate 
to be seen as a citizen - just wider content duplication with Jim, so that where people currently see 
the original Jim as a citizen, they must see the duplicate Jim as a citizen.
There is an external knowledge criterion, so that when the network of people outside of Jim and 
Jim’s duplicate, know that one of them is a swampman, and one is not, then they can make a 
discrimination, not on their current properties but on the extrinsic properties that they themselves 
apply.  Thus it is the social identity or the network’s identity of Jim that is at issue.
   It is the introduction of the concept of the swampman Jim that is a difference in the wide content 
beyond Jim.  Where this is absent, then swamp-Jim will be regarded as a citizen regardless of his 
swampman status.
   At that point, it might be thought, that although people would see Jim’s duplicate as a citizen, he 
still would not actually be a citizen.  I would remind people that citizenship is a social property and 
not a natural property.  If the only difference between two entities is the extrinsic property of the 
name they are given, then that is a problematic element in identity.  It would mean that renaming 
something gives it a new identity in a significant way.  In the case of Swampman, the name 
“Swampman” is seen as unusually significant. 
   The usual way to determine citizenship, or identity in general, is the entity being the closest 
continuer of the person who has the citizenship assignment.  In the case of the swampman, it is a 
closest continuer of the original person.  We have no specific definition of how fine-grained a 
continuer needs to be.
Swampman - Explaining the controversy
 
The core problem with Davidson’s example is that he himself defines the selection by saying it is 
identical.  If he had just said ‘something in a swamp that looks and acts like him’ then there would 
not have been such an issue.  It is the very fact that he baked the identicalness into the example 
that is the problem (for him).  So given the massive problems that I have sketched with maintaining 
a causal bias in understanding and explaining swamp creatures, the question for me becomes; not 
how this problem is dealt with, but why people do not automatically accept that identical swamp-
people are just like us and have the same kinds of rights and responsibilities?  I have reviewed the 
relatively extensive philosophical literature on Swampman, and the reason I think that they have 
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not generally done this is that the causal paradigm is so massively explanatory of the physical 
world that to throw it away based on a thought experiment is unpalatable to most people.  39
The literature seems to break down into three kinds of responses:
1. Denying Swampman’s humanity e.g Davidson.
2. Saying the example is implausible and not worth thinking about e.g Daniel Dennett
      “Swamp-man is not logically impossible, just not worth discussing.” 40
3.  Accepting Swampman’s humanity.  Such as Louise Antony.
Some people have taken the route from 1 to 2, such as when pressed on whether eating 
Swampman for meat was wrong David Papineau said “Merely Possible Cases are Irrelevant”   It 41
is amusing to quote the anecdote: 
I was originally roused from my slumbers by a graduate student at King’s College 
London, Eilert Sundt-Ohlsen. He was unhappy with the standard teleosemantic dismissal 
of the Swampman intuitions.   Pressing the point, he challenged me about eating Swamppeople. He 
argued that, if they have no mentality, as teleosemantics implies, then it would seem to follow,  absurdly, 
that it would be all right to kill Swamppeople and eat them as  meat.  This objection stopped me in my 
tracks. It is one thing to argue in the abstract that a good theory of representation should be allowed to 
override  everyday intuitions about Swampman’s mentality.  But when we are forced to consider the 
ethical consequences of this  decision, as I was by Sundt-Ohlsen’s question, then we seem to end up 
with the wrong answer. If we did come across a Swampman, it would clearly be wrong to kill it for meat. 
His answer to this conundrum is to change to the ‘it’s irrelevant” school of thought.
I take the central core of teleo-semantics to be the claim that the belief and desire roles are realised by 
selectional states in the actual world. This claim is perfectly compatible with the idea that those roles 
might be differently realised in other possible worlds, and that in those worlds we would then care about 
something other than selectional states. 
 It is a similar situation in quantum mechanics.39
  Dennett, Daniel, "Cow‐sharks, Magnets, and Swampman", Mind & Language, March 1996, Vol.11(1), pp.40
76-77
 Papineau, D. "The Status of Teleosemantics, or How to Stop Worrying About Swampman." Australasian 41
Journal of Philosophy. 79 (2001): 279-289.
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I have to say that at least that is the moral response.  If there is a creature that is in every way the 
same as you, but of different origin, then despite it being inconvenient for your semantic theory, 
you will let it live.  A problem I see with that response, is that it is a theory which is contingent on 
whether or not some unlikely event actually occurs.  This might be called the ‘Platypus theory’;  
What if there was a mammal that laid eggs like a reptile and had a bill like a bird?  ‘Don’t worry 
about it - such a creature is only a possibility, and we will worry about it when we see one.’
   I have already argued that swampman should be taken seriously if he exists.  However, the issue 
with ‘merely possible cases are irrelevant’ is that it is equivalent to saying that counterfactuals are 
irrelevant.  Counterfactuals cannot be irrelevant.  If they were, it would make health and safety, and 
disaster planning irrelevant, as there would be no need to concern yourself with what could 
happen.  
   A much better catchphrase would be ‘merely impossible cases are irrelevant’.  That is to say that 
if it is some supernatural intervention that is the example (such as with Shoemaker’s example of 
God’s stone tablets), then that is irrelevant because we don’t think it is possible to begin with.  
Since swampman is thought to be physically possible, then it is relevant along with other possible 
scenarios.
Accepting Swamp-people
In terms of accepting Swampman into the human family there are two papers that I know of.  One 
of them is Louise Antony’s Equal Rights for Swamp‐persons.   Here she makes the statement 42
that: 
I think it’s appalling the kind of narrow-minded (or should I say wide-minded?) prejudice Swamp-
persons face today… Stop stigmatizing spontaneous coalescence, that’s what I say. [Antony, 1996. p. 
70] 
After stating: 
I have no doubt that some biological categories, like species categories, are de facto historical, and I 
therefore concede that Swamp-persons are not, strictu dictu, human beings. [Antony, 1996. p. 72] 
 
She says: 
 Antony, Louise. "Equal Rights for Swamp-Persons." Mind & Language. 11.1 (1996): 70-75. doi:10.1111/j.42
1468-0017.1996.tb00030.x [Hereafter “Antony”, date and the page number]
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We need a psychology that under-writes a rationalist criterion of moral agency, one that warrants the 
extension of moral concern to any creature with cognitive capacities identical to our own, no matter how 
formed. [Antony, 1996. p. 74] 
The problem is not so much granting moral rights, but how far these rights should go.  Economic 
rights?  The right to have qualifications recognised?  Citizenship?  The right to drive a motor 
vehicle?  The personal rights the person otherwise has?  
   Even if we were to accept the full Swampman intuition - ‘Swampman is Davidson’, it only works if 
Davidson is vaporised just before the Swampman emerges.  If Davidson remains unscathed but 
the swampman emerges nonetheless, then we might think we have a problem because how can 
the swampman be Davidson in one instance and not the other?  I might be willing to accept that 
there would then be two Davidson’s with equal rights, but I can see that some others might not be 
as generous.
Let us investigate this scenario:  Imagine that one Tuesday at 3.00 pm, a swamp created duplicate 
of yourself drops by your house.  You have a nice talk and a bit of a merry time, but then at length 
you say, “I really must be getting on”, and you lead your swamp replica to the door and say, “Have 
a nice life”.  The reason you might do this is that you had all these experiences that you remember, 
whereas the swamp replica only remembers them.  That is all well and good, except that on the 
news a few weeks later, you see an article that says that cosmologists have discovered that the 
world is periodically ‘swamp created’ and just pops in and out of existence with the same content 
as before but no causal link.  This fact is not expected to change much, as it is regarded as merely 
an interesting cosmological fact, much like the findings of quantum physics.  It is also announced 
that the last time this happened was 3.00 pm last Tuesday.  Your swamp replica makes his way 
back to your house.  “This changes everything" he says.  "You’re just as much Swampman as me.  
I’ve been living rough for quite a few days.  Now give me your credit card - I’ve got things I need to 
buy.  Also, I need to access your underwear drawer."  About then, you realise that you also need to 
access your underwear drawer.  
   I hope to show with this rather far-fetched example that our intuitions about the matter are not 
actually powered by causal history - because if the causal history is taken away, we still feel like we 
should have more rights than our ‘apparent’ duplicate.  What I believe is at the root of the intuition 
is the feeling that another person should not have any of what we individually possess now, without 
us having an option to avoid that outcome or receiving something in return.  But how to justify it in 
any other terms?  First of all, the original ‘embedded’ person is the closest continuer in content 
similarity, not in narrow content similarity but wide content similarity.  We can call Relevant wide 
content similarity “Network identity”, as in the network of connections and information that apply to 
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the narrow content of the original, and not the duplicate as it follows a certain path through space/
time.
   I believe the concept of “Network identity” solves the peripheral problems around using content 
similarity as a means of identity.  It is another way of saying that the information held in ‘wide 
content’ about an entity is appropriate to the entity in question.
I will have more to say about the concept of Network identity later in this thesis.  So far, what we 
have learned is that randomly created beings can have meaning and value, by virtue of being 
selected as having it by other beings.  Now we must move on to more about causality.  That is, 
where philosophers have attempted to show that causality is necessary for what matters in survival 
and where I attempt to refute these claims.
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Chapter 4 - Pro causality hypotheses refuted
 
Due to the incredible explanatory power that people believe causality has, any situation whereby 
people propose a content-similar situation occurs without causality e.g. Swampman, has seen 
some philosophers wish to argue against it.  I am going to go through some of these arguments to 
refute them.
We have already seen that causality is not generative of identity.  Might it be part of what matters in 
survival?
Desired outcomes are not illegitimated by process errors
For people who believe in causal history as a source of identity and value, for something to have 
the right causal history, there must be a continual chain of cause and effect, whereby the end result 
is a result of all the relevant causes. However, in the case of fortuitously accurate process errors 
this may not be the case.
   Fortuitously accurate process errors are where there is a particular system, and there is an error 
in that system, but by coincidence, the error is the same result as was sought.  An example would 
be if ordering in a restaurant, and a waitperson fails to take an order correctly, resulting in the order 
not being placed in the system.  Suppose also that the chef accidentally makes an extra meal, and 
so the meal is then placed on the counter and delivered by the waitperson.  The question is 
whether this coincidence of errors should impact the person who has ordered the meal.  For 
instance, should the customer have to pay for their meal?  Incredibly, there are philosophers who 
believe not, as the causal chain is broken.
   Another example is a vending machine which is malfunctioning, so that when it receives money it 
does not vend the selected food, but instead randomly ‘vends’ a particular snack food every so 
often.  Let us also imagine that someone pays the machine, and they believe they have selected a 
particular snack food, and then at that time, the machine randomly vends that food.  The person 
walks away happy and unaware, even though there is no connection between their action and the 
food they received.  The owner of the machine is also happy because they got the money.  My 
view is that the machine malfunctioning, at that particular time in that particular way had no 
negatives for anyone, so there is nothing about that particular distribution of goods that needs to be 
corrected.
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Argument against the importance of causality 
P1: There could be a situation where there is an error, whereby the correct chain of cause and 
effect is not followed.
P2: We believe that if the desired outcome is generated, it is not illegitimated by it not having the 
right causal basis.
Therefore:  Having the right cause is not necessary for a legitimate outcome.
I think it is clear that people do not generally care why things happen, so long as they are the 
desired outcomes.  This suggests that in such cases as the swampman case, the semantic outputs 
of a swampman would be accepted as legitimate if they are the outputs that are sought.
Psychological Sequentialism
There is a further argument which can be made, (and in fact has been made) by Anthony 
Brueckner and Christoper T. Buford  in response to Scott Campbell, who argued for a view he 43
calls “psychological sequentialism”: 
This is the view that a causal connection is not necessary for what matters in survival. [Campbell, 
2005] 
Psychological sequentialism, is the thesis that cause is not necessary for survival.  Interestingly, 
this follows from Parfit’s teleportation argument and has no reference to Swampman, even though 
Swampman would be the purest example of type.
   In “Is Causation Necessary for What Matters in Survival?”   Campbell argues that Parfit has not 44
been explicit in ruling out the lack of need for a causal link when considering the various cases of 
what matters for survival.  In terms of psychological connectedness, he says that what is instead 
needed is quasi-connectedness - which is a concept very similar to what I call content similarity:
B at t2 is quasi-connected to A at t1 if and only if, while B is not psycho-logically connected to (or 
continuous with) A , B ’s psychological states at t 2 are just as they would be if B was 
psychologically connected to A . [Campbell, 2005. p. 381] 
 Brueckner, Anthony, and Christoper T. Buford. "Against Psychological Sequentialism." Analysis. 73.1 43
(2013): 96-101. https://doi-org.ezproxy.otago.ac.nz/10.1093/analys/ans138
 Campbell, Scott. "Is Causation Necessary for What Matters in Survival?" Philosophical Studies. 126.3 44
(2005): 375-396. P. 375.
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He specifically lays out a scenario whereby there could be an error in the transportation machine, 
but that the error (by some fluke) actually produces the correct outcome. 
 
The full example:
Suppose that you step into the teleporter, and your body is scanned and destroyed. The information 
about your body state is sent to the receiver, and stored in a memory chunk. Suppose that in the 
next memory chunk there is a randomly generated set of properties set aside for use the next time 
someone presses the ‘‘Produce Random Person’’ button, and by an incredible coincidence of more-
than-astronomical  proportions, this information exactly resembles the information about your body. 
Once the receiver has received and stored the information about you, it goes into production mode, 
and a signal is sent to memory telling it to send the recently-received information about your body to 
the production unit. But suppose that a tiny short circuit occurs at this point, and the request is 
directed to the next memory chunk, which contains the ‘‘Random Person’’ information, and this 
information is sent to the production unit instead of the information about your old body. Because of 
this tiny glitch, ‘‘Random’’ is produced instead of Replica. But Random is exactly the same as 
Replica would have been, had the glitch not occurred. Unlike Replica, Random is not 
psychologically continuous with you. But Random is psychologically sequential with you. [Campbell, 
2005. p. 381-2] 
To summarise: Information about a random person is stored in the machine and accidentally 
retrieved instead of the correct information.  The two sets of information are identical.  This is a 
good example, because for someone to oppose it, they would have to suggest that there was a 
reason to rerun the machine and follow the ‘correct’ process if the error was to occur.  There could 
be no such reason.  In response to this line of thinking, Brueckner & Buford give two examples of 
why cause is supposed to matter.  The first one is quite complex.  First of all, they give the example 
of workers on a production line making machines, “H-gears” and “G-gears”.  Fred makes a 
defective H-gear, but it is accidentally knocked off the production line by Wilma, who makes a G-
gear (also defective) that exactly resembles Fred’s defective H-gear.  When Wilma’s defective work 
reaches the end of the production line the boss takes it to be Fred’s work and is about to fire him 
until Fred explains that it is not his work.  Brueckner & Buford claim that: 
This is so even though the outcome (defective gear reaching the end of the line) is exactly similar to 
the outcome that would have eventuated had the tiny glitch not occurred. [Brueckner & Buford, 
2013. p. 100] 
All this example shows is that he should fire both.  Fred should still be fired because he had 
defective gear on the production line, that would have reached the end of the line if it had not been 
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for that accident, and Wilma should be fired because she had defective gear on the production line 
that did reach the end.  The example does not work for sequentialism at the micro-level anyway.
   Such an example does not work at the micro-level because sequentialism allows identity to be 
exactly replicated without cause. Therefore, objects can be associated with their creator without 
cause.  With the H and G gears, the critical issue is who made each object, and therefore who is 
responsible for it.  With sequentialism as the closest continuer (content similarity-wise) the 
responsibility is always preserved.
   Of course, outcomes can be similar, with different levels of responsibility for that outcome.  There 
is not a causal difference, but rather a difference of identity, with identity defined as the closest 
continuer in space/time.  This is not what matters, but what matters usually follows identity except 
in some special cases.
   What is more interesting is their second example which is the vending machine example:
Suppose that Barney puts a dollar in a soda machine and pushes the ‘Mountain Dew’ button. Due to 
a tiny glitch, no soda emerges. Barney turns away, and a few seconds later, another tiny glitch 
occurs…. This time the glitch happens to lead to the release of a ‘Mountain Dew’. Betty works right 
by the glitchy machine and is aware of its habits… Betty observes the release of a ‘Mountain Dew’ 
and grabs it. Barney, from across the room sees Betty, and he exclaims, ‘Wait a minute! That’s my 
‘Mountain Dew’!’ Betty correctly retorts, ‘No, it’s not’… [Brueckner & Buford, 2013. p. 100] 
This example needs no philosophical analysis - only a legal one.  When Barney puts a dollar in the 
machine, the machine (or it’s owners) owe him a soda.  They never owe Betty a soda.  Betty used 
the opportunity presented by the malfunctioning machine to steal a soda from the machine.  It is 
then claimed that the lack of a causal link “allows Betty to fairly claim the soda that Barney 
wanted.”  She is never able to do that. Even if the machine is spitting out sodas at random with no 
one around, she never has any legitimate claim to them. 
The argument from psychological ephemeralism
Huiyuhl Yi, in Against Psychological Sequentialism,  sets out an interesting example of why we 45
should reject Psychological Sequentialism.  He says:
…imagine a countless number of random object generators spread out over the universe. The 
function of a random object generator is to arrange a collection of particles in a random fashion, 
thereby generating a material object only to destroy that object instantly. Each machine repeats this 
procedure over and over again. …if there really are a great number of those machines, then there 
 Huiyuhl Yi, Against Psychological Sequentialism, Axiomathes, 2014, Volume 24, Number 2, P. 247.  DOI: 45
10.1007/s10516-013-9221-8
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may exist a being somewhere in the universe a moment from now whose psychological state will be 
exactly like your psychological state a moment from now, and therefore sequential with your 
psychological state now… 
…Psychological Sequentialism entails that so long as you are aware of the existence of those 
machines, you ought not to be afraid of your death. [Yi, 2014. p. 261] 
   In reality, it is only their location that is the problem, as it separates them from their network 
identity in terms of where others expect to find them.  If these ephemeral beings were simply 
materialised in the appropriate place and time, and stuck around, there would be no problem at all. 
Therefore the example utterly fails.  The one thing that is true, is that “as long as you are aware of 
the existence of those machines, you ought not to be afraid of your death.”  You may well be afraid 
of a ‘narrow content’, 'fate worse than death’ that the machines would create though.
   Yi also has an argument about whether someone should be held accountable for doing a crime if 
they merely have false (non causally linked) memories of doing it, as opposed to causally linked 
memories of doing it.  I think this is best dealt with as an externalist objection as below.
The externalist objection
Campbell talks about the Swampman case and the externalist objection to it.  He refers to 
Swampman without mentioning (or even referencing) Davidson.  Campbell’s view is most like mine 
in that it is explicitly about what matters in survival without causality.  However, his theory of 
psychological sequentialism leaves his theory exposed to problems that any narrow content view is 
exposed to.  Before examining those issues, let’s get an overview of his Swampman argument:
“Suppose that at t1 you are instantly destroyed. Suppose also that on another planet, a bolt of 
lightning hits a swamp just after t1,  and by an incredible coincidence a person, Swampy, is created  
by this event, who is just like you were at t1. Sequentialism entails that Swampy has what matters in 
survival for you.” [Campbell, 2005. p. 389] 
“Random, being newly created, is not yet causally connected to anything.  Replica, on the other 
hand, is causally connected to things,  through being the causal product of earlier states of myself.  
Thus, Replica can refer to things, while Random cannot (and the same applies to 
Swampy)” [Campbell, 2005. p. 390] 
“The externalist will then claim that no person can have what matters in survival for me if they do not 
have any beliefs, quasi-memories, intentions, and so on, because it is these sorts of states that the 
psychological theorist holds are what matters in survival.  So Random cannot have what matters in 
survival for me. Hence, what matters in survival can exist only if there is a causal connection, 
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because without a causal connection there will not exist any beliefs, intentions, etc.” [Campbell p. 
390] 
To counter this objection, Campbell calls the non-causally linked internal states “Near-beliefs” and 
says that “Near-beliefs will be almost the same as beliefs, and near-intentions will be almost the 
same as intentions” - Therefore they should be treated the same.  I believe that so long as the 
beliefs are called “near-beliefs”, the example will fail, because we talk in terms of beliefs and not 
near-beliefs.  For a start, it is not about whether the beliefs are beliefs or not, but whether they are 
veridical or not.  Whether they are veridical or not depends on whether we accept the non-causally 
linked person as the person or not. Thus, it is a circular argument.  
For instance, if a sequential (but random) being comes into existence, then when they talk about 
what they did yesterday, we might say that they have no right to speak in such a way, because 
they did not exist yesterday.  But if the only question of whether they existed yesterday is the 
externalist objection, then that is no proof that they did not exist yesterday.  
   In Davidson’s Swampman example, it is taken as given that the Swampman is not a person, and 
therefore they cannot have beliefs.  However, the Parfit informed viewpoint is that it would be a 
person, based on understanding what matters.  Scott Campbell makes Parfit’s view logically 
consistent with regards to cause not being needed, but runs into problems that only content 
similarity - particularly wide content via network identity can solve.
   In creating Psychological Sequentialism, Scott Campbell has laid a trap for those that oppose 
him, in that they accept what he says and then try and find an example which is that sequentialism 
and which seems intuitively absurd. Instead, they would be much better to use my selection 
criterion in the first section and say that random coherence does not mean anything until it is 
brought into the meaning sphere via selection by a causally continuous agent.  This method could 
even go so far as to say that the environment creates causal reality when the random agent aligns 
with it.
We have seen in this chapter that arguments that we need causality for what matters in survival fail 
and that Scott Campbell has a rigorous example that takes out most arguments for causality being 
important in survival.  Next, we will see if continuity alone is sufficient for what matters in survival.
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Chapter 5 - Continuity problems with Relation R
When speaking of psychological continuity, I speak of that which is psychologically continuous, as 
opposed to something that must have causal connection.  In any case, causal connection is 
knocked out by Scott Campbell’s version of the transporter argument.  He argues in a ‘digital 
version’ of the Swampman argument, that once we are converted to discrete digital information, it 
can hardly matter about that information’s causal history, but rather about it being identical with our 
current information.  Scott Campbell came up with Psychological Sequentialism as the more logical 
version of psychological continuity, and so I speak of Psychological Sequentialism conceptually 
when I speak of psychological continuity.
   In most ways, I agree with Parfit and Scott Campbell, but I do not agree that what a person is, or 
what matters to us, is just psychological continuity.  On a psychological continuity view, a person 
has survived if something that has sequential psychological continuity with that person crops up at 
some point.  One problem with this view is that if it were true, we could never know whether a 
person had survived or not, because we can not know whether or not something with sequential 
psychological continuity will crop up at some point in the future. So there has to be a further fact 
about what matters in survival, and that further fact is our connections with others.
Moreover, if a person with a different history should adopt psychological continuity with a prior 
person, then the original person would not be considered to have suddenly reappeared (the 
crossover problem). 
The crossover problem
The “crossover problem” is my name for what happens if an entity should become psychologically 
continuous with another entity.  For instance, by all of that entities’ mental content becoming the 
same as another entity, so that from then on, the second entity is psychologically continuous with 
the first entity.  For example, if we imagine person “Ted” dies and then immediately after their death 
we find that someone else “Gene” is mentally the same as Ted was at the time of their death.  In 
that case, it seems we ought to treat Ted as not being dead, but regard “Gene” as their survivor. 
   The reason that this is a problem, is that if the criterion for what matters is that a person has 
psychological continuity and connectedness with a prior person (which boils down to content 
similarity), but if this is achieved by two persons coming into convergence mentally, for whatever 
reason, it still would not be as good as ordinary survival, because they would have different 
histories with different rights and responsibilities arising from those different histories.
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I consider the crossover problem to be a key problem with psychological continuity as it relates to 
identity.  However, there are plausible and implausible versions of this problem.  Noonan gives the 
implausible one in his book “Personal Identity”  and it is kind of a ‘straw Parfit’ - or we could say 46
‘Strawfit’.  Noonan says:
If, say a child reads the autobiography of a historical figure.  Napoleon or whoever and 
subsequently becomes deranged and imagines that he is the person in question, acts and talks like 
him etc., then so long as no better candidate is around he is that person.  (Personal Identity, p. 170) 
(Parfit would almost certainly disagree.)
…This is I take it reductio ad absurdum of Parfit’s position on personal identity. (Personal Identity. p. 
171) 
Indeed it is, but more than that, it is a straw version of Parfit’s theory.  Noonan is saying that mere 
delusion by itself is enough for personal identity.  Delusion in and of itself is a state within an 
identity state.  In this case, it is a child who read about Napoleon, and so it is still that child.  
Furthermore, it is surely impossible to get enough information from reading about someone to 
become that person.
The plausible version of the crossover problem is that if a person has the extraordinary delusion 
that they are Napoleon, and their mental state becomes continuous with Napoleon just before he 
died, would we then say that Napoleon has survived? Clearly not.  Napoleon was a French military 
leader that was his social and network identity.  How can a mentally ill person become the object of 
their delusion for a few seconds and then stop being that person a few seconds later when their 
brain states slip out of connectedness with Napoleon’s?
There are two kinds of sequential psychological continuity that can follow from a person’s death:
1) Psychological continuity and connectedness are possible with a currently dead person because 
they stopped having brain states at some point.  So if someone stops having mental states, they 
have Psychological continuity and connectedness with all deceased people.  This minimalist 
conception generally is not what people mean by Relation R though.
2) Psychological continuity and connectedness are also possible with a currently dead person if it 
is the next psychological state which they would have achieved it they had lived.
 Noonan, Harold W.. Personal Identity, Taylor & Francis Group, 2004. ProQuest Ebook Central, https://46
ebookcentral-proquest-com.ezproxy.otago.ac.nz/lib/otago/detail.action?docID=182298 
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In either case, this means that if someone can merely achieve accurate psychological (sequential) 
continuity with Napoleon at the time of his death, then they become that person regardless of what 
their future psychological states are, as all future states now have psychological continuity with the 
achieved state of psychological continuity at one point.  So if a person went into a fever and 
achieved psychological continuity with Napoleon on his deathbed, then, when they recovered from 
their fever, someone might remark to them, “Napoleon - you speak English without an accent!”.
   With regards to Napoleon’s last words, they would then no longer be his last words:
Napoleon’s Grand Marshal, General Henri Bertrand, did hear some last words early in the morning 
of May 5th. 
   From three o’clock until half-past four there were hiccups and stifled groans. Then afterwards he 
moaned and yawned. He appeared to be in great pain. He uttered several words which could not be 
distinguished and then said ‘Who retreats’ or definitely: ‘At the head of the Army.’  47
So someone might ask the person, “Napoleon; what do you mean by: “Who retreats” and “At the 
head of the Army?”  Then whatever they said in explanation would be ‘what Napoleon meant by 
that’.  This is clearly absurd.  
   The absurdity is, that once they have recovered, although there is psychological continuity in a 
closest continuer sense, there is no psychological connectedness for there to be psychological 
continuity in a content similarity sense (for instance, memories).  There is certainly not enough 
narrow content similarity to gain network designation as Napoleon.
Skipping a portion of continuity
Another argument against psychological continuity alone, is that the actual continuity does not 
intuitively matter much in terms of overall identity anyway - much less in terms of what matters.  Let 
us imagine that tomorrow someone wakes up without apparent psychological continuity, by having 
memories of a day that no one else has experienced.  We would definitely say that it is the same 
person in that case - but that they have some delusional memories.  But what happens in a 
teleportation or swampman example when the person has extra memories?  Then they are seen 
as no longer psychologically continuous, and thus cannot be identified as being the person.  We 
see here (when we compare the two cases) that exact psychological continuity does not matter at 
all, as long as the person’s body is in the appropriate geographical location at the appropriate time.  
This understanding takes us back to animalism.
 Selin, Shannon, What were Napoleon’s last words?, Web, Accessed 22/6/20, http://shannonselin.com/47
2015/05/napoleons-last-words/
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   In the Groundhog Day situation that the protagonist Phil finds himself in in the Movie Groundhog 
Day , whatever the memories and personality traits that Phil displays when he wakes up each 48
day, other characters regard him as Phil, which counts against psychological continuity and even 
connectedness.  We might think it does not count against psychological continuity because he has 
psychological continuity from our (the viewer’s) perspective.  This is true, but from the perspective 
of the people interacting with him, he does not have psychological continuity, yet they always 
regard him as Phil.  This case will be discussed in depth in chapter 8.
   If we can imagine a further case of teleportation whereby the Enterprise’s captain beams away to 
a planet and then beams back again, he is always regarded as the captain regardless of the 
underlying process, so long as there is content similarity.  Actual psychological continuity is not 
required.  Imagine a baseline case where he is beamed to planet A and then straight away beamed 
back again.  In that case, everyone regards him as the captain.  If he is sent back in time, so that 
he experiences an extra day and is then beamed back, everyone still regards him as the captain.  
If he is not sent back in time so that he experiences an extra day, but somehow he has the mental 
consequences as if he did, i.e memories and such, the crew would still regard him as the captain.  
Basically, regardless of what happens, he is regarded as the captain, so long as he is very like the 
captain in personality and motivations, and we have got an understanding of where his body is in 
space and time at any particular point.
   In terms of our psychological or intuitive understanding of identity, whoever is around that is very 
like the person is the person, and when it comes to problem cases, it is whoever has the same 
history as per being the closest continuer.
   All of these issues tend to suggest that there is more to survival than simply psychological 
continuity.  Originally my answer to this question was “extended self”, as in what is the same 
(content identical) in you as other people, then I came upon the idea of network identity being the 
predictive connections between ourselves and other people.
Life trajectory
A similar idea to my idea of network identity has also been had by Heidi Savage with her idea of 
“life trajectory” , that being:49
 Ramis, Harold, Trevor Albert, C.O Erickson, Danny Rubin, Bill Murray, Andie MacDowell, Chris Elliott, 48
Stephen Tobolowsky, Brian Doyle-Murray, George Fenton, Pe.mbroke J. Herring, and John Bailey. 
Groundhog Day. Culver City, Calif: Columbia TriStar Home Video, 2002
 Savage, Heidi, "What Matters in Survival:  The Fission Problem, Life Trajectories, and the Possibility of 49
Virtual Immersion", Phil Papers, 2017.  [Hereafter “Savage”, date and page number]
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“The hypothesis is that the preservation of what matters depends, not just on continuity of the 
subject's psychology in an internalist sense, but also on the continued living of that subject's life, 
which involves being embedded in a particular objective environment. It is this continued living of a 
life that we will understand as constituting a person’s life trajectory.” [Savage 2017 p12] 
 “…to have what matters in survival, a previous psychological subject must be q-continuous with a 
current psychological subject both with respect to their psychologies and their extrinsic 
properties.” [Savage 2017]  50
Savage soon amends the idea of it being any extrinsic properties to being the subject’s permanent 
extrinsic properties.  She uses such examples as the Nozick’s Experience Machine to argue that if 
someone was immersed, and virtually recreated in such a machine, although they would have 
psychological continuity, it would not count as being a valuable continuation of life.
…many of us, I suspect, would recoil in horror at the possibility of entering the Experience Machine,  
viewing the persistence of the thing in the machine as a mere simulacrum of what that person once 
was, and viewing her fate in entering the machine as a fate in many ways like death. [Savage 2017] 
So here the question is not; have I survived? But have I survived well or, in Parfitian terms, “as 
good as ordinary survival”?
   Arguments against the experience machine are easy to challenge.  If there was a paralysed or 
locked in person, they might view the option to use the experience machine as not as good as 
ordinary life, but many would no doubt regard it as a great comfort.  Furthermore, there is a 
character in The Matrix  who not only wants to stay in the Matrix, but wants the knowledge of 51
being in it erased. “Ignorance is Bliss …And I want to be rich - someone important…” [Cypher, The 
Matrix].  This could not even make sense under Savage’s viewpoint.  Savage counters this by 
saying about virtual immersion scenarios:
 
…consider the anticipation we might feel if all psychological subjects could rid themselves, en 
masse, of the shackles of bodily decay by immersing their psychologies within a virtual world in 
which they are maintained independently of their bodies. [Savage, 2017. p. 23] 
The idea here, is that if it is everybody together in the machine, that will preserve the social links, 
when with individuals separately in the experience machine, they are not preserved.
 Since this paper was removed from the website and replaced with a completely new version of the paper I 50
cannot now reference the page number.
 Wachowski, Lilly, Lana Wachowski, Joel Silver, Keanu Reeves, Larry Fishburne, Carrie-Anne Moss, Hugo 51
Weaving, Joe Pantoliano, Bill Pope, Zach Staenberg, and Don Davis. The Matrix. Burbank, CA: Warner 
Home Video, 2001.
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   The main issue with Savage’s theory of extrinsic properties is that extrinsic properties alone do 
not give us enough purchase to allow for the fulfilment of her original hypothesis of what matters.  
Content similarity does.  It goes back to an issue raised at the start of the thesis: Why content 
similarity and not extrinsic properties?  I believe that content similarity is a more robust and 
physicalist understanding.  There are fewer questions about it.  If a person goes out of existence, 
the creation of another person who has the same mental content as the previous person is all that 
is needed.  With properties, most of them are historically based, and many permanent properties at 
issue can be stripped away in the five-minute world example, or causality gap examples given 
previously.
   For instance, I have the property of having received a degree from the University of Otago, and I 
have the property of remembering receiving that degree.  A replacement being could not have 
those properties, but it could have the same mental content.
   Consider the example of being the sole author of a particular paper.  Savage says: 
…suppose you possess the property of being the author of a certain paper. Then on the life 
trajectory theory, anyone who can continue your life trajectory must possess that property as well. 
But only the person who actually wrote the paper can possess that property, and that person is  
you. It seems, therefore, that any later subject who legitimately continues your life trajectory, which 
includes the property of having written that paper, must be identical to you. [Savage, 2017. p. 16] 
The issue here is that under our ordinary understanding, properties would be wiped out if we were 
using the Swampman example, or the five-minute world example, and that is just the kind example 
where someone could continue a life trajectory.  Moreover, in the Swampman example, whether 
the Swampman is identical to the previous subject by having its properties is the very question.  If 
we use content similarity as the decider of what is or is not the person we can slot in and out 
various components within the network, and so long as what we are slotting in and out remains 
identical, or very close, then what matters is maintained.
   Therefore, Heidi Savage’s 2017 account, while being one of the best accounts available of what 
matters, and somewhat close to my view, does not give a sufficiently compelling and detailed 
account of that subject.
Life trajectory Mark II 
In 2020 Heidi Savage published a new version of the life trajectory theory.  52
 Savage, Heidi, "What Matters in Survival: Self-determination and The Continuity of Life Trajectories", Phil 52
Papers, 2020.  https://philpapers.org/rec/TIEWMI
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While I accept that psychological continuity is fundamental for having what is important for survival, I 
reject the idea that retaining personal identity over time can be exhausted by the holding only of 
internal relations between a person’s psychological states. And, the reason is that such accounts 
allow for the loss of the property being a person, which I argue is important for survival. To remedy 
this, I offer a theory I call the "life trajectory" theory that includes satisfying certain externalist 
constraints, and an address this issue, which most theories of psychological continuity fail to do. 
[Savage, 2020. p. 2] 
In this version, she attempts a much more ambitious project, which does not merely supplement 
Parfitian psychological continuity and connectedness “r-relation” with life trajectory, but replaces it 
with the life trajectory theory.  It is a two-step process.  First, she has to prove that r-relation is not 
what matters in survival, but life trajectory is.  She attempts the first step by using Nozick’s 
experience machine thought experiment.  In this case, it is not that we value more than an empty 
life of mere pleasure which she argues, but that psychological states themselves are not of value, 
since a person has psychological states within the experience machine and yet their life is not a 
valuable one.
   Savage goes further than that and claims that ‘people’ using the experience machine are no 
longer persons as they are no longer able to act with self-determination in the world:
 
…as beings with self-determined lives, and therefore as being required to be able to interact with 
and affect their own environments. [Savage, 2020. p. 15] 
Why the need to go to the extreme length of claiming that people in the experience machine are 
not even persons?  The reason is that she does not want it to be merely the case that survival 
consists of Relation R and certain external relations, because then it could be claimed that those 
relations are merely desirous for different grades of survival, but not essential to survival itself.  
Realistically, this is to create a hard cut off between all the things that might matter in survival and 
survival itself.  For instance:
Clearly, there is a distinction between what matters in survival and a life worth living. [Savage, 2020. 
p. 9] 
Savage says that “our psychologies matter, but only insofar as they allow us to continue to be the 
self-determining beings we had always been.” [Savage, 2020. p. 20].  So this gives a very different 
take on the earlier quote saying, “psychological continuity is fundamental for having what is 
important for survival” [Savage, 2020. p. 2].  She is saying it is fundamental, but only in an enabling 
sense.  I could also say my legs are important, but only in the sense they allow me to walk.
 66
In this case, it moves the centre of value from the personal to the social. 
   Finally, we come to the life trajectory theory, which Savage approaches as a non-identity theorist.  
Because of this, she starts with an argument about intrinsic properties and q-intrinsic properties, 
which an identical person would have if placed into the same situation.  ‘q’ in this sense is 
quasi. Savage’s argument mirrors Parfit and Shoemaker’s argument about quasi-memories. 
A later subject B has the q-property corresponding to an earlier subject A’s permanent extrinsic 
property just in case B is able to relate to their current external context in a way indistinguishable 
from the way in which A did at the time of their cessation. [Savage, 2020. p. 18] 
Savage gives an example of someone having the property of having written a specific paper and 
says that for there to be what matters in terms of the continued existence of someone having 
written such a paper, or for there to be a good enough continuer to quality as that continuer being 
someone as good as that person for the purposes of having written the paper; they would have to 
have a specific list of internal mental properties, e.g: 
To satisfy condition (1), then, B would have to (a) quasi-believe they were the author of that paper; 
(b) quasi-remember having authored it to the extent that A did; (c) have the same quasi-attitudes 
towards the paper that A had; (d) be received in the external world in the same way as A was with 
respect to that paper, and so on. [Savage, 2020. p. 9]  
These criteria are surely mistaken, because either being able to relate externally in an 
indistinguishable way is important, or the internal mental properties are.  Both could be, but if the 
only purpose of the internal mental properties is success in being able to relate externally, then it is 
not hard to imagine circumstances in which someone could produce the external outputs, but not 
have the internal mental content that resembles the previous subject’s mental content.  They could 
be a philosophical zombie or a shape-shifting alien that pretends to be various people. 
   Even more damningly, they could even have the same mental property without having the same 
mental content.  For instance, they might have the same property of remembering, but the 
remembering itself could have a different internal construction.  
   Two builders working on building a house will each have a memory of having constructed the 
house - but different memories.  In this case, we cannot even say that they need to have the same 
memory as the person they are continuing from to qualify as having what matters about the 
person, because that is the very kind of thing that’s being disputed!
   The important point here is that dropping in someone with a different mentality to oneself in order 
to continue one’s life is a good deal less appealing than dropping in someone with the same 
mentality.  No one wants to have their place taken by a shape-shifting alien who can do everything 
they currently do.  People would rather go into the experience machine than that.   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   The experience machine example successfully shows us there is more to life than psychological 
states, but there is a gaping hole in the argument of trying to prove that subjects using the 
experience machine are no longer people.  Below is Nozick’s best representation of the experience 
machine:
We care about things in addition to how our lives feel to us from the inside. This is shown by the 
following thought experiment. Imagine a machine that could give you any experience (or sequence 
of experiences) you might desire.When connected to this experience machine, you can have the 
experience of writing a great poem or bringing about world peace or loving someone and being 
loved in return. You can experience the felt pleasures of these things, how they feel “from the 
inside.” You can program your experiences for tomorrow, or this week, or this year, or even for the 
rest of your life. If your imagination is impoverished, you can use the library of suggestions extracted 
from biographies and enhanced by novelists and psychologists. You can live your fondest dreams 
“from the inside.” Would you choose to do this for the rest of your life? If not, why not? (Other people 
also have the same option of using these machines which, let us suppose, are provided by friendly 
and trustworthy beings from another galaxy, so you need not refuse connecting in order to help 
others.) The question is not whether to try the machine temporarily, but whether to enter it for the rest 
of your life. Upon entering, you will not remember having done this; so no pleasures will get ruined 
by realising they are machine-produced. Uncertainty too might be programmed by using the 
machine’s optional random device (upon which various preselected alternatives can depend).  53
Even Nozick is not claiming that the experience machine is not giving the person experiences.  If 
he was, then it would not be an experience machine.  Nor realistically could he claim that that it 
was not giving the person experiences.  If the machine did not give the person experiences, it 
would not be an experience machine either - it would be a delusion machine.  Compare the 
difference between a machine that makes someone think they have heard a particular musical 
piece, to one where they actually hear the music.  In the former case, it may be because of a 
mislabeled disc and in the latter, the correctly labelled disc.  If someone plays a mislabeled disc 
they might think they have heard Beatles, but instead it is the Rutles - That is no good.  There is 
clearly less value in a delusion machine than in an experience machine.   
   So with the fulfilment of the two conditions of the experience machine: Providing a person with 
experiences, and with those experiences being provided to a person, how can the subject not be a 
person?  If it is them that is receiving the experiences, then how can it not be a person that is?  
How can it be claimed that they stop being a person by virtue of receiving certain experiences?   
If there is any doubt about this case, we can go back to what Papineau said about Swamppeople: 
“if they have no mentality, as teleosemantics implies, then it would seem to follow, absurdly, that it 
 Nozick Robert, The Experience Machine, Excerpt from The Examined Life (1989), Web, Accessed 53
22/6/2021, https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil3160/Nozick1.pdf
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would be all right to kill Swamppeople and eat them as meat.”   
   Here, we simply need to ask:  Can we kill someone with a VR headset on and eat them as meat?  
As much as we would sometimes like to do that, a quick look at the legal code would suggest that 
it is still not permitted.  In the case of the experience machine, it seems like we would both prefer it 
to death, and we would seek to preserve the lives of people hooked up to the experience machine.  
Therefore, I claim that the experience machine example fails to prove that a person’s psychological 
states do not matter.  It helps prove that they are not the only thing that matters but certainly does 
not prove that they don’t matter.
   Overall, what I can say about the Heidi Savage papers on what matters in survival is that it 
displays great intelligence and creativity, but in seeking to grapple with these massive philosophical 
issues she has overreached and fallen into a couple of potholes.  The example of the experience 
machine is particularly incredible, since it seems obvious that we would still consider someone 
hooked up to an experience machine to be a person.  As for the failure of the argument about the 
only requirement of psychological states being to produce external states, it is a little less obvious 
where that goes wrong, but its refutation is still quite devastating for a theory that is very close to 
my content similarity theory.
We must then look to see how a network identity theory can solve these problems.
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Chapter 6 - Network identity as what matters
For survival to be as good as normal survival, it requires content similarity over time. The kind of 
content that matters in survival is content to the widest extent possible, but specifically narrow 
content and network content.  Here we will explore and detail different kinds of content and their 
role in what matters in survival.
Narrow content, wide content and network content
Narrow content is the internal content of the thing or person at hand.  Wide content is the broad 
content information in the world overall to a specific scope.  For instance, we might duplicate a 
single human being, while on the other hand, we might duplicate Earth.  In the case of duplicating 
Earth, more content that pertains to a single human being has been duplicated.
   There is a reason that I say ‘Network identity’, rather than simply ‘wide content’.  A specific kind 
of broad content is the extrinsic links between a person in question and the other parts of the 
world, as well as the information held about a person outside of themselves.  Network identity also 
includes beliefs about an artefact or entity that are not truth-apt.  For instance, let us say there are 
two (theoretical) swampmen that have the (correct) added belief that they are swampmen: One 
tells everyone he is swampman, and a second swampman keeps it secret.  In that case, the 
secretive swampman is overall more like the original man than the ‘open’ swampman, but that is 
just because people may have irrational prejudices about swampman as a swamp man.  
Irrespective of the narrow content, these beliefs may lead more quickly to an erosion of the 
network content similarity of the swampman if people act on such prejudice.
Network identity as a subset of wide content
I define “network identity” as a limited kind of wide content that applies specifically to an entity and 
is specifically linked to that entity.  It is wider than social identity but narrower than being all 
content.  I see network identity as being a prime candidate for a ‘further fact’ about identity and 
what matters.  Network identity is other people’s and other entities’ understanding of the identity of 
a particular being and their tracking of that being through space and time.  The defining attribute of 
a network identity element, as opposed to a general wide content element, is whether the content 
involves information held within the network regarding the subject in question. 
For instance: It would seem to be enough in narrow psychological content terms to have a ghost or 
a ‘brain in a jar’, for it to be the case that a particular person persisted.  But this would not be as 
good as ordinary survival.  In the widest content terms, if the entire universe was duplicated, then 
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this definitely would be enough for ordinary survival, but this leaves no room for any non-standard 
continuation of survival.  Network identity as part of wide content takes what is important to us - 
what matters to us, and preserves that at the very least.  Network identity also provides part of 
what matters in terms of the distinction between identity and what matters about future states. 
   A person’s network identity is in the thoughts other people and entities have regarding a person, 
and any information about that person held in any form in the world.  One way to understand it 
would be to understand what the effect of complete and ongoing erasure of network identity would 
be like. 
  The effect would be to be a forgotten ghost.  For example, the psychological disorder of 
depersonalisation describes what it is like to have a perceived separation from your self:
 
I feel like I don’t exist, like I am a ghost who is walking round and interacting with the world my 
presence is not acknowledge and I have been forgotten by everyone.   54
This is a statement by someone in a depressive state.  I believe that this statement conveys some 
meaning to us.  If there was nothing more to existence than psychological continuity and 
connectedness, then what information could be conveyed by such a statement?
   Having your existence forgotten would be in many ways a fate worse than death, as at least with 
death some people remember your existence.  With the erasure of network identity, there is not 
even that.  In the case of an ongoing network identity elimination, no information about you would 
be able to reach anyone else.  They could not see you or hear you, and nothing you did would 
have any effect on them.  Understanding how devastating this would be to the average person is to 
understand a massively overlooked part of identity and what matters in survival.
Wide content, further facts and final facts
Let us briefly divert back into what identity is and away from what matters, to see the effect of wide 
content on what identity is.
   Parfit proposes that there can be no further fact about personal identity other than Relation R: 
psychological continuity and/or connectedness.  This view is essentially content similarity about 
psychological states, which he makes clear when he talks about reductionism.  Parfit writes: 
 
When we describe the psychological continuity that unifies some person’s mental life, we must mention 
this person, and many other people, in describing the content of many thoughts, desires, intentions, 
and other mental states [R&P 210] 
 scienceguy, Depression Forums, 2015, Web. http://www.depressionforums.org/forums/topic/110543-feel-54
like-i-dont-exist-anymore/
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There are two ways in which there could be a further fact about intuitive identity, which is also a 
further fact about what matters. 
1) Social beliefs about identity
Regarding my identity; My understanding is that other people’s opinions about it, and our own 
opinions, can form a further fact about what matters in survival.  Let us say, for instance, that no 
one thought that personal identity was maintained by an unusual cause such as a teleporter, or by 
no cause at all such as swampman.  In that case, it would form a reason to avoid teleporters and 
swamps during lightning storms.  It is an obvious reply to say that people may be wrong in their 
opinions, but since identity is at least a partially social phenomenon, it does matter what people 
think about it.  It is a fairly obvious point that animals are animalist.   People may not be.  People’s 55
understanding of identity has a great deal of influence on their identity itself.  People may have 
been much more willing to undertake a brain transplant in ancient Greece than presently, due to 
the ancient Greek belief about the location of the thinking part of the body, which they thought was 
the heart.  Therefore, it is clear that identity, as socially mandated, may require much more than 
just Relation R.
2) Network identity as a further fact about what matters in survival
Parfit opposes the ‘further fact’ view about personal identity.  That is, that there is a deep or further 
fact about personal identity beyond physical and psychological continuity, such that an abnormal 
cause of physical and psychological continuity could fail to produce identity, such as the case of 
teleportation.
   Strictly, there might not be a further fact about ‘personal’ identity where narrowly defined as 
pertaining to the person only, however when it comes to the concept of survival being “as good as 
ordinary survival”, the further fact exists in the domain of the social and network identity of the 
person in question.  If the non-normal cause does not preserve that, then the person’s overall 
‘identity’ will suffer.  So there may be no ‘final fact’ about identity (due to non-identicality in entities 
over time), but Parfit is wrong about there being no further fact about personal identity. That further 
fact is the network that exists as external connections between other people and us, i.e. our 
‘network identity’.  This can be disrupted by abnormal causes, thus forming a kind of further fact.  
For example: If someone said they had ‘died’ during surgery, and we took them at their word and 
treated them as a new person without the rights and responsibilities of the previous one, we would 
 And we regard animals in an animalistic way in terms of personal identity.  e.g. a snake with two heads, 55
whereas a human with two heads is two people.
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have the kind of conflict that arises with the Swampman case or the teleportation case.  In those 
medical cases where someone says, “I was dead for five minutes”, our intuitions are almost 
universally with the continuance of the person who ‘dies’.  In other words that they do not die, and 
their identity is preserved.
   Where there is a dispute about identity involving a living being, such as in the Swampman case, 
or even the teleportation case, we can seek to apply social or legal death to the disputed person or 
not.  But a very important component of this is whether their identity is even in dispute or not.  The 
very fact as to whether people believe that identity is extinguished or not provides a ‘further fact’ as 
to whether it is as good as ordinary survival or not.  The capacity for this to be disputed is not even 
necessarily based on science but may even be on a supernatural basis.  In any case, whatever its 
cause, the dispute itself provides at least a social ‘further fact’.  More widely, the external 
connections between other people and ourselves provide a further fact regardless of the cause of 
their disruption.  There are various ways in which these connections might be broken.  It might be 
just that an extended amount of time has passed, and the persons who hold those external 
connections have themselves died off, such as in a time travel case, or it could be Nozick’s “a very 
improbable random event occurs elsewhere in the universe”  random coherence case.  In the 56
latter case, the fact that it happens elsewhere in the universe causes a severing of network 
connections, allowing Nozick to generate the intuition that it is not us.  If we are instantly replaced, 
as in the swampman case, then the intuition is far less strong.  Furthermore, if we do not think this 
is a further fact about our overall identity, then our deaths are always contingent upon reanimation 
at some later date.  In which case, we never know whether or not someone has survived.
   Examine the iceman case where a mummified body was discovered by German tourists and then 
pulled from a glacier.   If we reconstitute the iceman as he was at the time of death, has he then 57
survived?  If he has survived, then how can it be that the intermediate existence of his mummified 
body somehow allows the experiences to belong to the same being, whereas they would belong to 
a different being if the mummified body was not present?
   The mummified corpse is certainly irrelevant to the iceman’s continued existence because there 
is no final fact about the iceman’s continued existence even when he was apparently alive.  There 
is the closest continuer understanding of intuitive identity, but even then, what appears to be the 
iceman from one second to another cannot conclusively be said to be the iceman. 
   The interesting thing about the mummified corpse in the glacier situation, is that under our 
intuitive understanding of identity, we do not have a point when we can conclusively say that the 
person’s existence has finished - it is always subject to future events.  If, for instance, we could 
miraculously revive the iceman’s corpse, then the person we would naturally consider him to be 
 Nozick, Robert. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003. p. 41.56
 “The mummy”, Ötzi, the Iceman. South Tyrol Museum of Archaeology, Web. http://www.iceman.it/en/the-57
mummy/
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would be ‘the iceman’.  This breaks our intuitions about identity much more than the split-brain and 
the teleporter example.  If someone gets trapped in a glacier for years and we later revive them, 
then under our current intuitions, that is not a new person.  But where it is someone created ‘from 
scratch’, straight after atomisation of the original, then many would consider them as such. 
   We can see that a good part of the further fact about overall identity has to do with whether 
people believe, or do not believe that someone has, (or does not have) some or other identity.  But 
it has the obvious relativity that just believing it makes it true.
   If we think about ‘identity theft’, then we have the situation where people external to us can ‘steal’ 
our identity.  That is strange given that we typically do not believe that identity has anything to do 
with those external factors, and yet we believe that a change in the understanding of them 
amongst other people can lead to a situation of ‘not as good as ordinary survival’ if our identity is 
completely stolen.  It is somewhat contradictory to hold these two beliefs about 1) The lack of 
importance of external factors to identity, and 2) It being crucial at the same time.
   I see two kinds of external identity factors that might be at play.  One is the internal 
understanding - who you think you are, and the other, the external understanding - who other 
people think you are.  So in the case of transformation, you might not believe that you survive 
teleportation, or lobotomy or taking LSD or whatever, and you are a new person now.  The external 
account would be similarly prescriptive as to whether a specific identity was rightly applied and/or 
at issue in the absence of anything else.  For instance, if it was simply the case that society 
regarded teleported persons as entirely new people, with the previous people eliminated from 
existence, then that social fact alone would cause teleportation to not be as good as ordinary 
travel.  In other words, a good part of identity may be ‘what we think about identity’ This is already 
the case with things like skin colour and ethnicity in general, but I would propose that the 
understanding be widened out to include all understandings of personal identity.  
   The other part of what I call network identity (that is relevant to our intuitive identity) is how we 
perceive other people to perceive us.  This perception is not simply in identity terms of whether we 
are such and such a person or not, but rather how we fit into the overall social schema.  This is 
very simple and basic.  It can be as simple as going on holiday, which causes a pleasant feeling of 
identity change.  
Alternately, it can be something like feeling a loss of identity from being a refugee, or in otherwise 
forced circumstances.  People might say they have ‘lost their identity’.  Yet none of this is seen as 
relevant when it comes to the philosophy of personal identity.  Nothing outside the person, or even 
the person’s own view is seen to matter.  So if there is a swampman that replaces me, then I might 
be thought to no longer exist, whereas if a corpse is shot into space and revived in a million years, 
I might be thought to have survived.  Surely it must be that our identity in our social and societal 
network is at least as important as our bodily identity.
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   This brings into focus an issue about identity, that a good part of our normally understood identity 
is external to us.  Whether this is ‘personal’ identity or some other kind of identity is not widely 
considered.  Someone can ‘steal’ your identity and ‘invade’ your personal space.  If we consider 
our wider social or societal identity to be part of our personal identity, this creates many problems 
for traditional theories of personal identity.  We believe there can be “identity theft”, but can 
someone steal a person’s personal identity?  One response to this could be that if someone were 
really to steal your personal identity, it cannot be them that is stealing it.  When we speak of 
someone ‘assuming someone else’s identity’, they are not putting on their body like a suit, nor 
have they become psychologically identical to the person.  It means that the assumer has taken 
the other person’s place in the public network of connections normally occupied by the person that 
they have assumed the identity of.  Consider the following case:  There is a murder.  The murderer 
feels very remorseful about his actions and so what he does is construct a machine that will turn 
the molecules in his body into a duplicate of the person he had killed, just before he killed them.  
Should the friends and colleges of the victim accept the duplicate as being the murderer or the 
victim?  The resulting being may have a particular view of their personal identity, but this will be 
less important to their life and ongoing happiness than what other people think.
   
I have shown in this section that we can see network identity as part of personal identity and 
certainly part of what matters in survival.  In the next chapter, we can see direct proof that persons 
require extrinsic factors beyond Relation R, for not just as good as ordinary survival, but simple 
survival.
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Chapter 7 - Interactivity in network content
In this crucial section, we see what is wrong with Parfit’s argument for what matters in survival.  I 
do so at first in a fun way and then in a more serious way.
The scholar’s mate on Parfit
Parfit says that “what fundamentally matters is Relation R (psychological continuity and 
connectedness) with any cause” [R&P 217].  In the popular conception of a ghost, it has Relation R 
in that we can imagine it having a mental life, yet by definition, they have not survived.  They 
certainly do not have as good as ordinary survival.  What about a blind, deaf ghost?  That sort of 
entity could have Relation R, and that would be a fate worse than death.
   That is actually ‘mate in one move’.  Parfit has said what matters in survival, and straight away, I 
have given an example that meets those conditions, and yet the entity concerned does not have 
what matters in survival.  This is because it is actually a supposed outcome of someone who in the 
popular imagination has not survived.  Ghosts have the identity of the person but not what matters 
in survival.  They are not survivors.  Parfit must have heard of the concept of ghosts, so why does 
he persist with his idea? There are two responses Parfit could give:
1) He could say that a far-fetched supernatural example does not matter.  So that if there were 
ghosts, then that would be a problem, but there are no ghosts, so it is not.  After all, Parfit explicitly 
rejects the spiritual view of souls in the form of Cartesian Egos [R&P 228].
If Parfit gave such a response, then the example could be naturalised into a technological form, 
such as uploading a consciousness into an isolated computer.  Parfit also uses a host of non-
actual examples like split brains, fission, fusion, and teleporters.
2) More likely, he would say: “What I really meant is you have got to have psychological Relation R 
and a body.”  Parfit defines a person as a mental being in conjunction with their body “Our 
existence just involves the existence of our brains and bodies…” [R&P 216]. 
Thus a person has to have a body.  In the split-brain example, someone can have half of their brain 
removed, and they are still the same person.  What about if we use the unused space in the head 
of someone who has had such a hemispherectomy and placed another half brain in there?  
However, when the surgeon goes to connect up the brain hemisphere to the spinal cord, he cannot 
be bothered, knowing that that is not a requirement for survival.  Or maybe he cannot. Maybe the 
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technology only exists to connect the blood vessels to keep the brain alive, but not hook it up to the 
nervous system.  - Like now, for instance.  So the (half) brain is in a body that is walking around, 
and it has psychological continuity and connectedness, but we would hardly consider the person to 
be surviving well.
   If we placed a whole brain in the body of a comatose person, but did not ‘hook it up’, that would 
hardly be considered any better. This might be something that could currently be done, so why isn’t 
it done?  That is, why doesn’t the medical community offer the transplantation of a healthy brain 
into the body of a brain-dead person?  It seems like this should be a transplant option for terminally 
ill people who have a condition that does not affect their brain, and yet it does not seem to be used 
as a treatment option.  They would have a body.  They would have psychological continuity and 
connectedness, so what is the issue?
   I propose that the issue is that it would not be a life worth living and therefore not as good as 
ordinary survival.  That was move 2.
At this point, Parfit might sigh again and say: “What I really meant when I said over and over again 
that what matters is Relation R, is that what matters is Relation R and having a body and having 
that body be hooked up in the right kind of way so that the person can conduct their affairs in the 
normal way.
   Prior to saying what matters in survival, Parfit says we are not separately existing beings apart 
from our brains and bodies:
Our existence just involves the existence of our brains and bodies and the doing of our deeds and 
the thinking of our thoughts and the occurrence of certain other physical and mental events [R&P 
216] 
So Parfit first defines what it is for us to exist, then he says that what matters in survival is 
something other than that - Only Relation R.  But it turns out that what really matters in survival is 
that we have our criterion for existence in identity terms be fulfilled at later times.  This is a big 
problem, because the entire point of Parfit’s project is to pull identity and what matters apart. 
That was move 3.
If I were to ask Parfit WHY someone needs to be able to do things, rather than just think thoughts, 
he would have to say it is to connect with the outside world and have certain kinds of relations with 
it.  So that is what is also important.  Those relations are part of survival being as good as normal 
survival.  That is what I mean by network identity. 
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   “There is a reason that I say “Network identity”, rather than simply “wide content”.  A specific kind 
of broad content is the extrinsic links between a person in question and the other parts of the 
world, as well as the information held about a person outside of themselves.”  58
That was move four: Checkmate on Parfit - The ‘Scholar’s Mate’ if you will.
Persons remaining an active part of the network
The heart of the problem with Parfit’s understanding of what matters in survival is not strictly the 
breadth of content preserved and the links within that content.  More importantly, is whether the 
subject in question remains an active part of the network .  When Parfit uses teleporter examples 59
to say that what matters is psychological continuity and connectedness, he silently imports an extra 
concept: A human body and its functionality.  
There are two ways in which a person can be cut off from other people, and yet we could still 
consider them to have in some sense survived.
   Firstly a person could be transported alone to a distant place, and we could still consider that to 
be survival in a normal sense although not as good as ordinary survival.
   Secondly, there could be a scenario where a person survives but no longer has any links with 
anyone else because of the erasure of everyone’s memory of them, so for instance, their friends 
and family no longer know who they are. So it not being as good as ordinary survival indicates that 
there is value in the extrinsic world. However, some may maintain that they have still survived in 
the normal sense and can build up new connections again.
   Finally, we come to the case where the person’s consciousness survives, but they have no 
access to the world.  At that point, we can no longer say that they are surviving, particularly where 
they no longer have a body at all.  An example of this would be a brain in a jar where the ‘jar’ is not 
connected to any means of communication and could not be.  An illustration of this would be the 
situation where a person died, yet their consciousness still survives in some sort of ghostly form, 
unable to interact with anyone, especially if they are unable to send and receive information 
between that consciousness and the world at all.  In that case, it seems likely that the only 
response we could have to the death of someone’s physical body would be the response we 
typically have now - that is, to bury or burn their body and to have cultural ceremonies of farewell.  
In that case, they would have Relation R, but people would presumably act as they do now in 
terms of bereavement.  It could even be worse, because knowing that the person’s consciousness 
was still active could make the deceased’s loved ones even more upset. The heart of the problem 
 Chapter 6 of this thesis.58
 Parfit himself has in some sense remained an active part of the network after his death by me engaging 59
with him in this thesis.
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with Parfit’s understanding of what matters in survival is not strictly the breadth of content 
preserved and the links within that content.
This section has proved that something more than Relation R (psychological continuity and 
connectedness) matters to survival.  Next, I seek to explain how Parfit did not see this.
Parfit believed that Relation R was all that mattered in survival, yet he would certainly have come 
into contact with the popular conception of ghosts and souls, where it is evident that Relation R is 
not all that matters to survival.  So how could Parfit not have taken account of this information?  I 
believe the answer to this question is that Parfit had already sought to distance himself from non-
reductionist conceptions of personal identity:
 
Many Non-Reductionists believe that we are separately existing entities. On this view, personal identity 
over time does not just consist in physical and/or psychological continuity. It involves a further fact. A 
person is a separately existing entity, distinct from his brain and body, and his experiences. On the 
best-known version of this view, a person is a purely mental entity: a Cartesian Pure Ego, or spiritual 
substance. But we might believe that a person is a separately existing physical entity, of a kind that is 
not yet recognised in the theories of contemporary physics. [R&P 210] 
Although Parfit takes the Cartesian view very seriously for the purpose of refuting it, he makes two 
mistakes:
1. He ignores the fact that even where people attest that a person is in some sense a separately 
existing entity, spiritual and religious people believe that death has more or less the same 
consequences as non-religious people.  For instance, we redistribute the possessions of dead 
people regardless of our religious beliefs.  If we were Christians who believed in the second 
coming and resurrection of believers, we might otherwise leave the possessions of the faithful 
to be used upon their return, much like ancient Egyptian burial traditions. 
   Essentially, regardless of religious beliefs, we regard people who no longer have a body as 
no longer existing for legal and most social purposes.
2. The more serious mistake is that after dismissing the Cartesian view, Parfit fails to consider 
existence aside from our brains and bodies. Partit’s view is essentially that what we are, are 
bodies and brains, but what matters is psychological continuity and connectedness within some 
body and brain.  For Parfit, the body and brain are the essential containers of consciousness, 
whereas consciousness is the really important part in that container.
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With the second of these mistakes, Parfit ignores the possibility that something other than a body 
and a brain could contain a consciousness.  We could theoretically upload a consciousness to a 
computer, for instance.  We can easily apply Parfit’s arguments about eyes and artificial eyes to 
brains and artificial brains [R&P, p. 208].  
We must define a person differently from Parfit, that being that a person is Relation R and a means 
to interact with the world outside of their consciousness.  That means of communication is typically 
a body, but need not be.
To summarise: Parfit defines survival as requiring Relation R only.  In this section, I have shown 
that we require Relation R and the kind of connectivity that our bodies give us for a state to be 
survival.  In previous chapters, I have argued that with regards to different grades of survival, 
specifically survival that is as good as ordinary survival, positive extrinsic relationships and 
statuses need to able to be maintained.
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Part 3 - Time loop examples
Now that we have set up the theoretical structure to understand what identity is, and what matters 
in survival, we can look at an example where we can draw on this knowledge to make sense of a 
situation.  We cannot draw on this knowledge in normal factual situations because such a situation 
whereby we might need the knowledge never arises.  However, we can use certain counterfactual 
examples to assess and make sense of a situation that a protagonist might find themselves in.  
One such counterfactual situation is a time loop.
   A time loop is a situation where a period of time ‘loops’, except that for certain participants their 
memories of previous loops may be maintained.  Our intuitions about participants in time loops can 
tell us a lot about how we perceive identity and what matters in survival, and what theoretical basis 
for understanding it makes sense. 
Chapter 8 - The Groundhog Day scenario - What it is and why it 
matters
Imagine the following scenario:  One night, Phil goes to bed as usual.  When he wakes up in the 
morning, everything seems normal at first, but as he goes about the day, he soon notices that 
everything is exactly as it was the previous day.  People seem to be doing the same things as 
yesterday, and they do not remember the day he experienced yesterday.  Also, the flow of events 
is the same, unless he explicitly causes it to change.
  This situation repeats day after day with no end in sight.  This single repeating day is now his new 
reality, but should this fact influence his behaviour throughout the day?  If so, or not, then why?
   This question is at the heart of a number of fictional treatments of the situation, most notably 
“Groundhog Day”, a 1993 Movie featuring Bill Murray.   From this, I have shortened the name of 60
the situation to GHDS or “Ground Hog Day Scenario”.
It is worth recounting the basic plot of Groundhog Day, since it is the reference point for the many 
variations that came after, and because it is the name given to the phenomena of repeating the 
same thing repeatedly.  
   Groundhog Day (the movie) centres around one day that Phil Conners, a TV station 
weatherman, has on a visit to the small town of Punxsutawney.  He is there to witness the 
Groundhog Day festival where a Groundhog (also called Phil) is said to predict whether spring will 
come, or whether there will be six more weeks of winter.  When Phil gets to the town, he checks 
 Ramis, Harold, Trevor Albert, C.O Erickson, Danny Rubin, Bill Murray, Andie MacDowell, Chris Elliott, 60
Stephen Tobolowsky, Brian Doyle-Murray, George Fenton, Pe.mbroke J. Herring, and John Bailey. 
Groundhog Day. Culver City, Calif: Columbia TriStar Home Video, 2002
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into a guesthouse and goes to bed.  He awakes the following day and delivers his TV report on the 
Groundhog Festival.  Phil and the crew attempt to leave but cannot get home because of an 
unexpected snowstorm along the route out.  Phil returns to the guest house for another night, but 
when he wakes up the following morning, he finds it is the same day again, with the only difference 
being that he has memories of the previous day;  February 2nd, Groundhog Day.  This cycle 
repeats day after day, with only Phil’s (deteriorating) mental state being continuous.  Initially, he is 
confused, and then depressed, but then Phil’s behaviour becomes increasingly erratic and 
unhinged until he says, “I’m not going to live by their rules anymore.” [Groundhog Day, 33:44]  He 
then turns a corner onto a new hedonistic lifestyle, whereby he indulges himself in many ways. 
   After some time (in his mental understanding), hedonism starts to wear thin, and Phil sets his 
sights on forming a romantic relationship with his producer.  At first, he uses the ‘trick’ of having 
superior biographical knowledge about her, which he has access to from his experience of the 
repetition, but this only gets him so far, and he is ultimately repeatedly rejected.  Romantic rejection 
sends him into despair, and he repeatedly tries to commit suicide, with the only result being that he 
wakes up back in his bed at the guesthouse.  Faced with this circumstance, Phil turns to 
developing his personality into one that is less narcissistic and more regarding of others.  His more 
generous persona has the ultimate result that he is able to woo his producer, Rita, and convince 
her that he is an acceptable life partner, at which point the loop finishes, and Phil exits back into 
normal narrative time.
Groundhog Day is only one of many different stories based on repetition, and although many of 
these are simply based on Groundhog Day, it is worth taking the time to at least compare their 
details with the original and other real-life situations where repetition is a feature. 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The chart below provides a brief comparison:61
Type of time loop Brief description
1) Friedrich Nietzsche 
The concept of 
"eternal recurrence"
The entire universe is in a time loop.  Only some people may recognise this, and 
realisation or awareness of this possibility is supposed to have major 
psychological consequences.
2) Groundhog Day A single man is in a one-day time loop in a small town, which everyone else is 
unaware of.  After a large number of loops he exits the loop.
3) Edge of Tomorrow A single man is in a time loop during a war.  He finds a woman who has also 
been in a previous loop state, but only he has memories of his previous loops.
4) Star Trek TNG, 
Cause & Effect
The Enterprise is caught in a time loop due to a temporal phenomena in space.  
This eventually becomes apparent due to déjà vu being actual memories of past 
events.
4) X-Files, Monday The character Mulder is caught in a time loop of which only he has partial 
memories, primarily a feeling of déjà vu.
5) Stargate SG-1, 
Window of 
Opportunity
Earth and another world, that it is connected to via the Stargate, are caught in a 
time loop due to the activation of alien machinery that needs to be decoded in 
order to be stopped.  Only two members of the Stargate crew have memories of 
the previous loops.
6) Medical condition: 
Transient Global 
amnesia 
The subject is caught in a ‘time loop where they forget biographical information 
after about two minutes, and ask the same questions repeatedly - often in an 
entirely predictable way.
7) Medical condition: 
’Groundhog Day 
student’
A person has a constant and overwhelming sense of déjà vu.  The person has 
insight, but does not do certain activities such as reading newspapers, because 
he feels he has done them before.
8) Medial condition: 
“Chronophrenia"
A case where a woman believed she had already lived her life before and had 
memories of the previous life which influenced her actions in the current life.
9) Doctor Who, 
Heaven Sent
The doctor is trapped in a transporter time-loop, in a castle designed to get 
information out of him.
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One question is why we should even care about any of this?  It being merely a fictional scenario 
among many fictional scenarios.  Actually, there is a reasonable amount of religious and 
philosophical engagement with Groundhog Day's ethical themes.  For example, Catholic 
philosopher Michael Foley says in Touchstone:
“The ground of Groundhog Day, in other words, is Catholic. And just as our secular celebration of the 
day unwittingly echoes a deeper truth about the Light revealed to the gentiles, so too does the movie 
unwittingly point the way back to that truth.”‑  62
That attention certainly helps the study of repetition and the GHDS (Ground Hog Day Scenario). 
However, that is not why we should care about it.  The real reason is: That once certain variables 
are altered, our behaviour seems likely to alter, but those variables were never seen as being 
influential in the behaviour to begin with.
The most important thing to come out of the GHDS, is that thinking about how we would act in it 
forces us to move away from causal history and towards content similarity as an explanation for 
regarding something as having value.
   When people speak of reasons for our beliefs or actions, they typically refer to events that have 
taken place in the past.  I propose that the events actually having taken place in the past are not a 
necessary condition for referring to them, or reacting to them, but rather that the current content of 
the universe is as it would be if they had occurred.  By content, I mean both in terms of substance 
and its organisation.
   My understanding is that the causal history was never necessary, but was merely a convenient 
place to supposedly draw value from because it is incredibly analogous to the true source of value 
which is content similarity.  In the philosophy of science, there are many examples of such 
parallels.  Florence Nightingale did not understand the modern theory of how and why diseases 
spread, but she had a somewhat parallel understanding which accorded her success.  Moreover, it 
is almost always only because of causal history that we can have content organised in the right 
way.  It is just that if we remove causal history, the value remains from the content being organised 
in that fashion, regardless of how it came to be so.  Confusing content similarity and causal history 
is a bit like confusing something with the means of doing that thing.  For instance, someone might 
be Christian and think a bible has value because it contains God’s word.  Indeed, before the 
invention of electronic texts, bibles being books was essential, and therefore to get rid of all books 
 Foley, Michael. “Phil’s Shadow”. Touchstone, 2004, Web. https://www.touchstonemag.com/archives/62
article.php?id=17-03-012-v
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would be to effectively extinguish the word of God (for those that believe it is such).  These days it 
would not do so.
   A specific state is maintained by informational similarity, not causal history; however, to solve 
certain problems, it is required that knowledge of this fact is included in the similarity.  So a 
universe created five minutes ago is more similar to a causally antecedent universe where people 
do not know it was created five minutes ago, than where they do.  This more or less solves the 
causal theory of reference problems that may arise.  If the causal theory of reference is true, then 
different things are true in a state of identical content if they have a different causal history, but this 
is only an issue where it is recognised to be as such.  However, for someone to recognise it as an 
issue is a difference in the content itself,  and therefore it is not an issue.
In the GHDS various ontological explanations could be behind the events.  For instance:  
 
1) It could be that Phil is travelling back ‘mentally’ in time to the previous day.
2) It could be that Phil dies at the end of each day, and then he has generated anew, where he was 
located the previous day, along with everyone else, but only his memories are updated.
3) It could be that Phil is being transported mentally to a parallel dimension where everything is the 
same as the previous day in this dimension.
4) Each ‘day’, we could just be being shown a parallel dimension where everything is the same 
except Phil’s memories are updated.
5) It could be that at the end of each ‘day’, some machine or force is altering everyone and Phil’s 
brain and body (but not his memories) to be the same as it was at the start of the previous day.
I will not examine them individually, but depending on which one of these scenarios is true, a 
traditional theory of ethical and general action is thought to be required under a causal theory but 
not under a content similarity theory.
   Let us examine possibility number five.  For instance, say Bob enters into a contract so he owes 
Bert five dollars.  Bob uses a machine that alters his brain and body and the universe in general so 
that the world is the same as before Bob made the promise. In that case, Bob no longer owes the 
money.  That is the intuition that arises from Groundhog Day.  For instance, if Phil plays poker with 
someone in Groundhog Day and then wins, but he is not paid before the end of the day, then that 
debtor does not owe him any money the following day.  Of course, it would be possible to claim 
that Phil does owe the money but does not know it.  I say that it is not reasonable to make that 
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claim.  This differs from forgetting because forgetting is a state where someone had a memory but 
then lost it.  However, in returning a person to a prior state, they effectively never had the memory 
to begin with.  Any cascade of subsequent mental events that flowed from the recording and 
forgetting of the memory are effectively removed.  The key issue is whether the information still 
exists in the universe.  Information can only be held as a state of the universe.  If the universe goes 
back to how it was and there is no further information outside the universe, then someone having a 
memory pertaining to a previous state of the universe - now inaccessible to us, does not create the 
rights and obligations that such a memory would normally entail.  For instance, imagine that we are 
in a universe-wide time loop of a single day and have been for two ‘cycles’, but no one remembers 
the loop.  That should mean under our normal conception of things that a whole lot of extra rights 
and responsibilities have accumulated during that extra day.  But if there is no information 
regarding that which exists in the world, then those rights and responsibilities can not exist in the 
time loop world.
Here we have seen that scenarios whereby there is a time loop occurring are important to 
examine, because they allow us to see that the actual occurrence of something is of no relevance, 
compared to the information relating to that thing still existing.
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Chapter 9 - Identity and obligation in timeloops
Concerning identity in a GHDS, our current intuitive conception is this: Whatever it is that wakes up 
in your bed tomorrow (and is your closest continuer through the night) that looks very like you, is 
you.  Even if you have had a complete personality and mental change overnight, that person (who 
may not even have any of the same mental content as you) now inherits your rights and 
responsibilities.  That is our basic animalism under the law.  Simultaneously, another intuitive 
conception is:  An actual duplicate of someone, without the same causal history, would inherit none 
of their rights and responsibilities.  For instance, if a swampman replica arises, then that 
swampman does not gain the rights and responsibilities of the person they are identical to.  The 
intuitions raised by the GHDS are that rights and responsibilities do not work in this way, even if 
everyone in the situation thinks that they do.  For instance: There is a fact about the world that 
makes it that even if we believe that we are entering into a contract on a certain basis and that 
basis remains unchanged, then that contract is still not valid.  It is not that we cannot enforce the 
contract - It is not a valid contract.
   When Phil wakes up, everyone regards him as they did yesterday despite his changed mental 
content.  They expect the same things of him as they did their previous day, so reciprocally he has 
the right to expect the same things of them as he did yesterday.  But neither of them should.  
Neither of them has that right.  If they did, it would simply be his task to convince them of the fact 
and vice-versa.  This is not their respective tasks, and it is not just a question of reasonableness 
but a question of logic.  It cannot be that there are conflicting rights and responsibilities in this way.
   If we use the causal history theory to resolve these cases, then “What actually happened in the 
past” is the question that we would ask.  This is all very well, But what if the past’s conflict?  Who 
owes what then?  If I acquired debt to you of five dollars in my past and in your past you acquired 
debt to me of ten dollars, but no one remembers any of it, then is any obligation still in force?  Who 
owes who what?  The resolution to this problem tends towards a somewhat Lockeian ‘memory’ 
view of personal identity, but rather than memory or lack of it being the factor in itself, memory is 
merely part of the overall content being considered.  This is if we can even posit the idea of a ‘past’ 
in that sense.  The past can only be the past if there is information pertaining to it in the universe.  
Where such information is absent, or only represented by some local and unconnected content 
such as one, or even a number of people’s memorys, then it has little relevance.
What about the role of content similarity in the GHDS?  
Content similarity is an issue in the GHDS, in that we would not want to think that ‘particular 
history’ was such an issue when Phil wakes up each day.  That is, how Phil reacts to the world 
should not depend on the exact metaphysical circumstances of his plight - which is what it would 
have to be for the ‘particular history’ enthusiast.  For instance, if the entire universe from the 
 87
previous day had just been duplicated, and Phil had been thrown into it, I would not expect that 
would be the prime issue as to whether he could continue to pursue relationships with the people 
in that world.
   Surely the issue is the interruption (for him) of normal narrative time, and non-memories of all 
their connected experiences, that people around Phil have that is the problem - It is not contingent 
on certain metaphysical facts that he does not have access to, that are the determiners of how he 
should act.
   My claim is that, although the metaphysical or cosmological setup is thought to be very 
important, it is content similarity within any particular setup that is important.
What objections could there be to such a content similarity thesis?
It might seem that only being held accountable via state of content similarity could be a convenient 
way to get away with crimes.  For instance, someone might decide to steal a certain amount of 
money.  They might then place the money in their house, where they might easily come across it 
and then step in a machine that returns them to the mental and bodily state of before they had the 
thought of stealing the money.  The person’s experience then is of unexpectedly finding money in 
their house.  The question is: Should they be held accountable for this crime?  Under a causal 
history view, the answer is definitely “yes”. However, under (at least) narrow content similarity, it 
looks like the answer is “no” because their content is the same as before they committed the crime, 
and so it would be equivalent to convicting someone of a crime that they could be accurately 
predicted to do, but had not done yet.
   If we accept the intuition generated by the GHDS, the crime should remain unpunished because 
rights and responsibilities can not be transferred in that way.  Of course, they would not have any 
right to the money either because they did not have any right to the money in that previous 
situation.  It is just a question of whether someone should be punished for something they did not 
even know they had done.
   If such a case seems problematic for the content similarity view, don’t worry because there is an 
analogous difficulty for the causal history view.  Say someone makes an exact duplicate of another 
person.  What rights does the duplicate have?  Of course, the standard response is to say that the 
duplicate does not have the right to the original’s causal history.  If it did, then it would have a right 
to all of their possessions.  This is even doubly more so if a ‘swampman’ replica emerges.  It is not 
allowed to take your stuff!
   But this is a problem when it comes to the restriction of rights.  If someone is in prison and their 
accomplice makes a duplicate of them outside of the prison to carry on their nefarious purposes, 
then if we do not grant that duplicate access to the causal history of the prisoner, we have no 
reason to imprison the duplicate.
 88
   Under the causal history view, if a ‘swampman’ Charles Manson emerges, we have no reason to 
imprison it if we cannot link it to the causal history of an imprisoned Charles Manson, even if they 
are identical in every respect.  
   Under a content similarity view, a swamp Charles Manson could be imprisoned on a narrow 
content similarity basis because he would represent the same danger to society as the original 
Charles Manson.  He would not be Charles Manson in an identity sense as conveyed by closest 
continuer, but he would have what matters about Charles Manson point to point via content 
similarity.
What about contracts and agreements with people in the past under the GHDS?
Let us put an argument in a more formal structure and see what we can make of it.  To set up:
 
1) The things and people I have already interacted with are in the past.
2) If someone rationally makes an agreement with me in the past they are bound by that 
agreement.
3) This is true even if they do not remember making this agreement.
If all of the above is true, then the following scenario in Groundhog Day must be true:
1) Imagine that Phil buys Rita a coffee, and Rita says, “I will pay you back next time we meet”.  
2) The next day Phil sees Rita, he asks for the money back.  
3) We do not believe that Rita has to pay back the money.
The third part of this triad is based on us believing that Rita does not have to pay the money.  
Some people might believe that she does.  I expect most people would have another intuition, as 
do I.
A breakdown of the argument: One or more of the following must not be true
1) The things and people I have already interacted with are in the past.
2) If (a) someone; (b) rationally; (c) makes an agreement; (d) with me; (e) in the past 
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Then they are bound by that agreement.
3) This is true even if they do not remember making this agreement.
The most likely candidate for dispute is either 1 or 2e.  Both have to do with ‘the past’.  It is 
certainly Phil’s past.  Is it Rita’s past?  A causal history view would say that it is only Rita’s past if 
there is a direct causal connection between those events and the present (There is an indirect 
causal connection through Phil).  Whether there is a causal connection or not depends on the 
metaphysical setup of the situation.  It seems clear that Rita does not owe the money.  So it just 
does not matter about the causal connection; what matters is the content similarity.
   A content similarity view would say something like: Rita only owes the money if there is sufficient 
content that would follow on from her state of owing the money.  At the very least, her state has to 
be different than before she owed the money.  One formulation could be that she does not owe the 
money if her state is identical to any of her states before she made the agreement.
   What about the situation where Rita goes into the GHDS owing money to Phil?  It might be 
easier to think that she does not owe anything after the first loop.  If that were the case, it would 
likely be the same for all other rights and duties.  A content similarity view also allows a way for her 
to legitimately continue owing the money over and over again, even though in Phil’s past, she had 
already repaid the money any number of times.  We would then likely say that she owed the 
money whenever her content returned to the state it was in before she repaid the money.
   It is worth bearing in mind that this is just a ‘narrow’ content view.  There is a lot of content in the 
GHDS, and some of the content - such as Phil’s, is not in alignment with this.  In a repeating 
situation, his mental state is in a state post-which she has repaid the money.  His financial state is 
not.
In Groundhog Day, Phil checks into a guesthouse called “The Cherry Street Inn” for one night, 
before reporting on the Groundhog festivities.  He ends up saying another night when a blizzard 
unexpectedly comes in, which means that he is in the same place for the beginning and end of the 
time loop which follows.
   How many breakfasts is Phil entitled to during his stay at the Cherry Street Inn?  Let us say that 
accommodation and breakfasts are treated separately at the Cherry Street Inn, and Phil is entitled 
to two breakfasts during his stay.  On the third day, Phil comes down to breakfast.  He has already 
eaten breakfast on the two days previously.  To how many breakfasts is he entitled?  My answer is 
one further breakfast at that point.  So following breakfast on the third day, he has eaten a third 
breakfast - he is only entitled to two, so how can that be?  There are a number of possibilities: 
1) He was not entitled to that third breakfast. (But ate it regardless)
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2) It was not his third breakfast.
3) It was his third breakfast, but somehow he is entitled to it.
4) It was only the second breakfast that the guesthouse recorded as serving him.
It is a composite case.  It was Phil’s third breakfast, but only the second breakfast that the 
guesthouse has noted serving him; therefore, he is entitled to it.
   What is it that makes it the case that someone is entitled to something?  First of all, there has to 
be a relation of entitlement that is created at some point, so if the world ever returns to the state 
that it was when that entitlement was created, then that entitlement is in force again.  This is wide 
content similarity.  So Phil has found the world in the same state as when the entitlement was in 
force.  Therefore the entitlement is in force again.
   Someone might say that in terms of breakfast as a composite case (based on content similarity), 
the world is more similar when the guesthouse lays out breakfast than the guesthouse does not lay 
out breakfast, yet whether they prepare the dining room in that way does not affect entitlement.  I 
would say that in a minor way, it does affect entitlement.  The closer the world is to when an 
entitlement was in force, the greater the force of the entitlement.
   What about the situation where a person is entitled to breakfast at the Cherry Inn, and at that 
time, the Cherry Street Inn is painted blue?  Then later, when the person partakes of the breakfast 
the Cherry Inn it is painted red?  
Later again, the Cherry Street Inn has the red paint scraped off and is again painted blue.  Does 
that fact increase the entitlement to breakfast?
   Even under a content similarity schema, the colour of the Cherry Inn is unrelated to the breakfast 
entitlement, as it was never relevant content in terms of a breakfast entitlement, even in normal 
narrative time.  It can hardly be relevant in a time loop if it is not relevant in normal narrative time.   
The last example I will give is when Phil checks out of the Cherry Street Inn, having exited back 
into normal narrative time.  How many nights stay is he liable for?  Let us say that upon checking 
out, Phil remarks to Mrs Lancaster (the proprietor of the inn) that although he appears to have 
stayed two nights, he has been stuck in a time-loop and stayed a thousand nights.  If she accepts 
this, how many nights should she charge him for?  I believe the correct answer is two nights, but 
how can this be if all parties agree that he stayed one thousand nights?  The reason is that the 
content of the situation is such that it is identical to him having stayed two nights, except for his 
memory of having stayed one thousand nights.
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   To make it clearer, if we could time-loop the whole world, without anyone having memories of it 
afterwards, and if everyone agreed that it had happened, payments, after the loop had occurred, 
should not reflect the loop having taken place.  So you should not have to pay an extra day’s rent 
or get an extra day’s pay, for instance.  To do so would be to make a fundamental ontological 
mistake.  The mistake, in general, is that since causality and content have generally tracked 
together, people have seen them in the same light.  Where we take causality and content apart, we 
can see that causality is redundant as means of determining our behaviour - only content can do 
that.
   If I may give a further example: We can imagine that someone presses a button, and what this 
causes to happen is that the entire Earth, its content and orbital proximity are reinstated to the 
state they were in 24 hours ago.  The rest of the universe is unaffected.  We could then say that 
the relevant content had changed such that the situation of 24 hours ago is the actual situation.  
So, who is owed what is in the state that it was 24 hours ago, not where it was just before the 
person pressed the button.  In this case, time and the vast majority of the universe have moved on 
- it is later in time.  Despite this, it makes no sense if you stay at a hotel and get a bill for an extra 
night’s accommodation.  The relevant content is appropriate to only one night’s accommodation.
For the purpose of linguistic rule-following, it is worth pointing out that where content is identical 
between an original and a copy, our linguistic usage has automatically accommodated content 
similarity as the criterion of value.  We see this with computer files, whereby if I am working on my 
thesis and my supervisor asks to see the thesis, he might say: “Send me the file”.  He does not 
intend me to pack up the computer and send him that, as that is where the file is located.  So the 
linguistic usage has moved to refer to content similarity where people see it to be identical.
Items and item identity
A good example of how network identity operates is in the following case:  A burglar breaks into a 
house while the owner is away.  He takes all of their possessions away, and then in order not to 
arouse suspicion, he makes exact copies of them and takes the copies back to the house and 
places them where they were.  The owner comes home and does not notice the change.  Then the 
burglar’s house accidentally burns down, destroying all of the householders’ possessions.
   Six weeks later, the householder comes home and finds their house stripped of their believed 
possessions.  They ring the police, who say the burger has come in and confessed what he did.  
He has burgled the house and also put some other items in their place.  Unfortunately, they were 
unable to recover the original possessions, but they got the burglar to remove the items he left in 
the house.  They hope the householder will now consider the matter closed.
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   What we see here is that item, and item identity are different.  When the burglar put the identical 
items in the house, they took on the network identity of the original items, even though they were 
not the original items.  As such, the victim of the burglary has effectively been burgled when the 
police have said that they have restored the situation.  Once the householder discovers that the 
items do not have the right identity to be their belongings, it does not matter because the 
duplicates have what functionally matters about their possessions.
   We can see with item identity that items gain their identity from their spatial arrangement over 
time.  The “Item” being any particular defined object.  If we can imagine a number of time slices, if 
we insert an identical or near-identical object or entity into one of those time slices (and take out 
the original), it can take on the object’s identity or identity through time.  If found not to have that 
identity, it still has what matters.
   We can see this when Phil wakes up in bed every morning of Groundhog Day.  He is not identical 
to the Phil who went to bed the previous (non-looping) night, but he is close enough to take on 
Phil’s identity.  As the Swampman case shows, this is a situation that we may be inclined to grant 
that someone has what matters in survival if they are identical but without the right kind of causal 
history.  Yet in the GHDS case, Phil is not even identical to his previous self so far as the other 
people in the time-loop are concerned.   63
   To make this clearer, when Phil wakes up, he is close to identical (mentally) to how he was the 
moment before in the time loop (along the lines of normal psychological continuity). Furthermore, 
when he wakes up, he is apparently bodily identical to how he was in the time before the time loop 
- he might have just been hit by a car in the loop, for instance, but shows no sign of physical injury.  
From the viewer’s perspective, outside the time-loop, he has mentally undergone a sudden and 
massive mental transformation.  However, even with this huge shift, there is never any suggestion 
that he is anyone but Phil, because he is still the closest thing to Phil around.  This counts against 
the mental continuity view as far as personal identity is concerned and towards an intuitively 
animalist and closest continuer view (and somewhat content similarity) version of personal identity.
 Interestingly, a swampman can only be identical in one way, but can be ‘close enough’ in numerous ways. 63
For example, one of the ways a swampman may ‘get it wrong’ is by having memories of events tomorrow 
rather than today.
   It may seem intuitively plausible that a swampman is more likely to have the correct memories up to this 
point than also of the future, but actually, it is orders of magnitude more likely that a swampman will have at 
least some correct future ‘memories’ than correct memories up to exactly the present point in time. Thus, Phil 
is far more likely to be a swampman on that particular basis.
   Why do I say this?  A swampman is unbelievably unlikely, but within this unlikeliness, it can have various 
kinds of mental states.  Only one of these mental states is identical to the original it is ‘being the swamp-
person of’.  But in an enormous number more potential cases, it has mental states that the original person 
will have at some point in the future or did have at some point in the past.
   An enormous number more again is mental states the original person has never had, nor will have.  A 
subset of these is mental states the person would have if they were in a time loop under various future 
scenarios.  A further subset, are states where that time-loop gives them correct beliefs about future events.
   It may seem strange that a randomly generated being is more likely to have correct beliefs about future 
events than to have currently correct beliefs, but that is just the nature of logical space around these things.
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People not in the time-loop, but in personal proximity to the time-looping person have no access to 
what may or may not have happened in the previous loop.  All they experience is an abrupt change 
in the person’s mental state and then ignore that abrupt change in terms of how they make their 
identity assignment.
How can we deal with cases where there is content similarity but not content identicality in terms of 
rights and privileges of individuals?
   One outcome from the burglar case is that it shows that items and item identity are separate.  
Items exist in physical space, whereas item identities exist as mental concepts.  The issue is that 
when trying to work out the facts about the identity of persons and items over time, where those 
items or persons are replaced with identical items or persons, we seem to get a divergent 
understanding of what is happening based on whether we are using content similarity or causal 
history to assess the situation.  
   However, the real issue is that we have a mental ‘map’ of the situation and adherence to this 
map is what we take to be the facts about identity rather than the physical identity as such.
   The illustrative phrase is that “The map is not the territory”, and in just such a way, the identity is 
not the item.  
The identity is just something that we apply to the state of an object with a particular spatial 
continuity of its parts.  Rather than identity just being defined in terms of causal history and content 
similarity, a functional definition would help map the intuitive identity.
   Functional identity is just whatever successfully takes on the role of the item or person in 
question.  This helps overcome a difficulty with content similarity that it can allow a person to swap 
in or out identical objects and persons within a network of expectations and entitlements but not 
create a new expectation or entitlement.
   As I said earlier: “If the world ever returns to exactly the state that it was when that entitlement’s 
creation, then that entitlement is in force again.” However, this creates a problem where something 
comes into existence as a good example of that thing, or person, that might exist but is not a 
duplicate of any actual item or person.  For instance, it seems like a swampman who is not a 
duplicate of someone cannot have a citizenship.  If a swampperson slots into a particular role, then 
he or she can fulfil the personal identity of an existing person and take on their citizenship along 
with the rest of their identity, but if that person never existed to begin with, then the swampman’s 
rights are severely curtailed, and that does not make much sense.
   The basic problem is that the facts about the swampman cannot be contingent on existing facts 
about some other person.  That would mean that the very same creature would have no rights at 
all if the original had not existed.  There is a network identity answer to that problem, but also a 
narrow content answer.
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The problem of differing swampman rights depending on a predecessor’s existence gains greater 
clarity if we reset the swampman argument but under a different causal scenario:   
   There has been a case reported of a sheep giving birth to an apparently human-like figure, which 
local people took to be the result of a sexual liaison between a ewe and a human male.   This is 64
somewhat more approaching the ‘non-specific’ swampman case, as people mistake a creature (a 
deformed lamb with a non-human cause) as human.  So let us imagine a similar fictional case 
where I go swimming one day and drown, with my body sinking unrecovered into the depths of the 
sea.  At the same time, a whale gives birth to a severely deformed whale calf that resembles me in 
every detail and has the same mental content I had at the point of my drowning.  The calf, ‘in its 
confusion,’ swims away from its mother and ‘strands’ on the beach.  Uniquely, the stranding is not 
fatal, and the calf makes its way to my house, puts on my clothes, and lives life as I did before.
   In this case, if we respect content similarity above causal history as a criterion of value in what 
matters, we might well grant the calf the right to continue on my life, quite as if it had been the 
original ‘me’ that had returned from my swim.  In this case, a narrow content identical being has 
inserted itself in my life-stream and is able to take advantage of the various emotional and legal 
linkages that apply to me and draw on my entitlements.  
   If we are to grant that case as one where the whale calf can take over my life, there is still the 
alternate case that such a calf is born, but I never existed.  In that case, the calf may wade ashore 
as before, but are we then proposing that we should then identify it as merely a deformed whale 
calf and concerned citizens ought to attempt to push it back into the sea from whence it came to 
prevent its ‘stranding’?  That would seem to be too severe a call on causal history, but content 
similarity seems to have less to say about it, and this is because, in the first case, its rights are 
contingent on my original land-based existence.  Since I do not exist for it to have content similarity 
with, it seems like it reverts back to being merely a deformed whale-calf, to be pushed back into 
the sea.
   What needs to be the case, is that where such a creature emerges, that has no content similarity 
with an existing person, but in fact it has a plausible (but potentially entirely fictional) personal 
history, it is treated on the basis of its societal functional identity, not its factual and actual causal 
history. So, for instance, if it remembers going to a school that does not exist, but which would be a 
typical school and remembers a network of friends and acquaintances that do not exist, but are just 
the kind of people who could exist, so overall it fits well into the typical cultural setup of the era.  In 
that case, it should be able to participate in that setup as one of its members. 
   The point is that it should not need to have actual content identity with an existing member of 
society in order to be able to partake in society, as long as its narrow content is within the range of 
the typical member’s.  This is a kind of content similarity that applies to cultural and national groups 




rather than strictly individuals.  In terms of the GHDS, if this was not the case, then whether the 
residents of Punxsutawney were even right to treat Phil as human or not throughout the GHDS 
would depend not only on the metaphysical setup, but also on his degree of identically to the 
original Phil.  I have thus sought to point out why this is not the case.  Whatever the origins of a 
time-traveller, swampman, or deformed whale calf, we ought (rationally) to treat them on the same 
moral and social basis as we would a being with the usual history.
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Thesis Conclusion
We started by seeking the facts about personal identity. These facts turned out to be hard, if not 
impossible, to obtain.  The reason for this is that people understand personal identity in a 
psychologically intuitive way.  Making up thought experiments to probe that psychological 
understanding shows that it is more of a heuristic for our actual circumstances than a system that 
works in all possible cases.
   A paradigm case is looking at a childhood photo and considering “whether or not it is me?” There 
may be no unique or ‘final’ facts that will make it me in all possible cases.  There is no atomic 
threshold that makes it me or not me.  It would be much easier to tell if I was an unchanging object, 
like a diamond floating through space.  In this view, I am in agreement with Parfit.
   In many ways, this result is disappointing as I had really wanted to find out the truth about 
personal identity and specifically use content similarity to solve the problem.  
   In terms of what matters in survival: This thesis bolsters the case against causality being what 
matters that Scott Campbell has already developed. What matters is content similarity, and that 
content similarity should be to as wide a scope as possible, so it includes our connections with as 
many other people as possible.  
   The critical achievement of this thesis is to prove that Parfit is incorrect when he says that what 
matters is only Relation R.  Specifically, what matters in survival is Relation R and the ability to 
connect with other beings.  I most convincingly set this out in chapter seven.
   The concept of Network Identity is an important one.  It provides a missing link and a further fact 
about what matters in survival.  It shows that we already do not consider it to be survival where the 
connection element is absent. For example, we never thought there is survival in the case where 
someone is cut off from all access to the world, although many forgot this.  Parfit was one of them, 
and his specific error was to see what mattered as psychological continuity and connectedness, 
whilst smuggling into that description the ability to connect with others, without acknowledging it.
   In talking about Groundhog Day, we have the counterfactual circumstance to examine what really 
matters in survival, and we can see that what matters is Relation R plus connection with others.
There have been many twists and turns in this journey for me.  Mostly it was finding again and 
again that Parfit was pretty much right about everything, but also finding that he was not clear on 
one big thing - causality, which Scott Campbell cleared up, and finally that he was specifically 
wrong in saying that all that mattered in survival was Relation R.  I have made a huge amount of 
work to get there, but I am happy to have the success of this thesis judged primarily on the truth of 
this important philosophical theory.
